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DRAFT July 1, 2007
Jerome Barron’s seminal writings that advocate a First Amendment right of access to the media2 make a powerful case that constitutional speech protection must actually yield dynamic, broad-based public
debate in order to ensure the vitality of our democratic society. Barron
posited that the First Amendment’s underlying purpose is to enable effective democratic debate, and he accordingly called on courts to invoke the
First Amendment to provide underfinanced and socially marginalized
speakers access to the infrastructure of public discourse. The mass media’s persistent incapacity to inform and guide public discussion of critical issues – most notably in recent years the decision to invade Iraq3 –
reaffirms that argument’s urgency. In the four decades since Barron’s
seminal writings on access rights appeared, however, the Supreme Court
and free speech theorists have largely ignored or scorned his prescription
for a First Amendment right of access to the media, along with similar
democracy-advancing arguments for strong First Amendment rights of
access to the political process. When the end toward which First
Amendment access rights would aim is so obviously important, and when
institutions that control access to public debate continue to suppress and
exclude critically important dissenting perspectives, why has the case for
access rights fallen so far out of favor?
This article defends and elaborates Barron’s argument that courts
can and should employ the First Amendment to advance equalization of
access to means of expression. Its primary goal is to explain and refute
the two principal intellectual critiques of that argument, which I call the
libertarian critique and the regulatory reform critique. Part I sets the
stage by assessing the state of Barron’s legacy. The first section emphasizes the elements of Barron’s case for access rights that fuel the two critiques: an egalitarian, instrumental theory of expressive freedom, opposed
by the libertarian critique; and the commitment to a judicially enforced
1 Professor of Law, Villanova University. Thanks to Mike Carroll and Chaim Saiman
for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2 See JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO MASS MEDIA (1973); Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to
the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1968) (hereinafter Barron, Emerging Right);
Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967) (hereinafter Barron, New Right).
3 For an indictment of the U.S. media’s failures to facilitate effective public debate
before and during the early part of the Iraq War, see Gregory P. Magarian, The First
Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime
Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 117-21 (2004) (hereinafter Magarian, PublicPrivate Distinction).
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constitutional requirement of broadly distributed expressive opportunities, opposed by the regulatory reform critique. The second section accounts for the importance of these critiques by noting First Amendment
doctrine’s wholesale rejection of access rights. It also notes technological optimists’ disdain for distributive accounts of expressive freedom and
explains why developments in information technology have not diminished Barron’s case for access rights.
The article then proceeds to its primary task: assessing the two
stores of intellectual capital that underwrite doctrinal rejection of access
rights. Part II critically analyzes the first of those positions, the libertarian critique, which stands on a foundation of market triumphalism. The
first section presents the views of one group of libertarian thinkers, including Charles Fried, Steven Gey, Jon McGinnis, and Christopher Yoo,
whom I classify as conservative libertarians. These critics openly espouse a First Amendment theory that elevates the autonomy of speakers,
including powerful institutions, above all other concerns. They advocate
a regime in which the economic market dictates people’s opportunities to
participate in democratic discourse, and they assail any departure from
their laissez-faire vision as statist tyranny. The second section presents
the views of a second group of libertarian critics, including Robert Post,
Martin Redish, and Kathleen Sullivan, whom I classify as progressive
libertarians. These theorists sympathize with access rights advocates’
egalitarian concerns, and they offer thoughtful accounts of the First
Amendment that acknowledge the importance of effective public debate
for a healthy democratic system. My analysis, however, reveals that progressive libertarians fully embrace the conservative libertarians’ core
constitutional commitments: the autonomy-focused theory of expressive
freedom, the insistence on market distribution of expressive opportunities, and the rhetorical strategy of demonizing access rights advocates as
creeping tyrants. Part II concludes by setting forth the primary empirical,
theoretical, and normative reasons to reject the libertarians’ faith in unfettered market control of democratic discourse.
Part III critically analyzes the other principal attack on access
rights, the regulatory reform critique. The first section describes the arguments of regulatory reformers, including C. Edwin Baker, Jack Balkin,
and Mark Tushnet, against access rights. Regulatory reformers agree
with access rights advocates that public discourse needs to become more
egalitarian and informative. They also agree that government can and
should play a role in improving public discourse. They break with access
rights advocates, however, by arguing that courts should not invoke the
First Amendment to broaden media access. Regulatory reformers trust
the elected branches of government to implement access reforms, and
they exemplify the prevailing academic pessimism about the utility of
judicially enforced constitutional rights as a vehicle for progressive social
change. Accordingly, they urge courts to narrow the scope of the First
Amendment so that legislators and regulators may impose progressive
access rules. The second section takes issue with the regulatory reform
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critique. I first contend that, just as the libertarians indulge an uncritical
faith in the market, regulatory reformers indulge an uncritical faith in the
elected branches of government. Our present electoral system suffers
from an unusual amalgam of electoral pathologies – some of which erode
elected officials’ accountability to the public generally, others of which
serve to perpetuate the exclusion of poor and socially marginalized people from electoral politics – that doom any hope for legislative or regulatory efforts to broaden media access. I then contend that constitutional
rights provide a stronger theoretical basis, and courts a stronger institutional vehicle, for broadening access to the means of expression.
This article endeavors to show that Barron’s brief for access
rights remains as persuasive today as it was 40 years ago. The libertarian
critique of access rights represents a reckless plunge into the market triumphalism that has become a regrettably dominant feature of post-Cold
War political rhetoric. The regulatory reform critique places untenable
reliance on elected officials in a system rife with electoral pathologies
and undervalues judicial review in a field constitutional courts are well
positioned to navigate. Moving forward, advocates of access rights
should pick up Barron’s flag and consider how best to achieve the aims
he so eloquently articulated. This article’s conclusion suggests First
Amendment attacks on the very electoral pathologies that undermine the
regulatory reform critique as a first step toward broadening media access
and encouraging reformist impulses in the elected branches.
I. THE LEGACY OF BARRON’S CASE FOR ACCESS RIGHTS
Professor Barron’s writings form the cornerstone of a case for
First Amendment rights of access to the means of public debate. The first
section of this part describes Barron’s case for access rights, emphasizing
two key aspects of his argument: an underlying commitment to an egalitarian and instrumental theory of expressive freedom, and close attention
to the institutional benefits and hazards that various public and private
institutions present for the development of informative and inclusive public debate. These theoretical and institutional elements of the case for
access rights provide the context for the article’s subsequent discussion of
the intellectual currents that have led present First Amendment doctrine
to reject access rights. The second section notes the Court’s steadfast
refusal to take access rights seriously in the years since Barron’s writings,
and it briefly explains why access rights remain crucial even in an era of
broadly accessible information technology.
A. Barron’s Theoretical Foundations and Institutional Insights
In advocating a First Amendment right of public access to the
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media,4 Barron sought to constrain “the unanticipated power which the
marriage of technology and capital has placed in the relatively few hands
which dominate mass communication.”5 Employing economic and sociological insights, he explained how the profit structures and communicative dynamics of the mass media had created strong incentives for media
corporations to avoid presenting opinions on controversial issues.6 In
these circumstances, the conventional, “romantic view” of the First
Amendment as a shield for speakers’ autonomy had “perpetuated the lack
of legal interest in the availability to various interest groups of access to
means of communication.”7 Accordingly, Barron called on courts to interpret the First Amendment as ensuring a positive right of access for
otherwise excluded speakers and ideas, to be applied with sensitivity to
the distinctive contexts of different communications media.8 By “access”
Barron meant not merely equal time for opposing opinions – a concept
whose limitations he well recognized – but open space for a full range of
subjects and viewpoints.9 Among the forms he saw access rights taking
were a public right to have media outlets present discussion of public
issues,10 a right for political speakers to purchase advertising space or
time on equal terms with other members of the general public,11 and a
right to have newspapers consider submissions for publication without
ideological bias.12
Barron’s call for access rights grew out of an egalitarian, instrumental theory of the First Amendment. He emphasized “the positive dimension of the first amendment: The first amendment must be read to
require opportunity for expression as well as protection for expression
once secured.”13 In the tradition of Justice Brandeis14 and Alexander
Meiklejohn, 15 Barron contended that the Constitution granted expressive
4 Barron’s emphasis on the word “media,” combined with his incisive analysis of the
print and broadcast media, should not obscure the breadth of his conception of access rights,
which extended to real property. See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 492-94
(analyzing and praising Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968)).
5 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 506.
6 See Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1644-47. Barron’s view that the mass
media’s lack of ideology drives their failure to engage the public in political debate provides
an interesting contrast to contemporary arguments from both the left and right that media
outlets deliberately advance their own policy preferences.
7 Id. at 1642.
8 See id. at 1653 (advocating contextual analysis).
9 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 150-59 (exploring differences between “access” and
“fairness”).
10 See id. at 151.
11 See id. at 55-59 (proposing model statute).
12 See id. at 48.
13 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 509.
14 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), discussed in Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1648-49.
15 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948), discussed in Barron, New
Right, supra note [x], at 1653.
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freedom not out of a romantic commitment to autonomy in the abstract
but rather because of our democratic system’s need for inclusive, thorough debate about matters of public concern.16 He believed the equal
participation values central to democratic ideals should inform the expressive freedom meant to implement those ideals.17 The First Amendment guaranteed not just a private right of powerful institutions to speak
but also “public rights in the communications process.”18 To the extent
the media impeded rather than aided in broadening participation in public
debate, the proper role of First Amendment doctrine was not to shield
media owners’ autonomy but rather to obligate them to distribute expressive opportunities more broadly.19 Barron viewed access rights as an
alternative to left-wing calls for state suppression of right-wing ideas,20
and he emphasized that his inclusive vision encompassed speakers on the
right as well as the left.21 In particular, he found access rights inconsistent with prohibitions on hate speech,22 instead advocating vigorous efforts to open expressive opportunities for members of historically disadvantaged and marginalized communities.23
Barron portrayed access rights as serving two values that appear
inextricably linked in his conception of democracy: better informing the
public and broadening participation in public debate. First, he maintained
that the validity of a First Amendment access claim should turn on
“whether the material for which access is sought is indeed suppressed and
underrepresented.”24 Exposure to the broadest possible range of information optimizes the effectiveness of the political community in influencing
and evaluating government decisions.25 Thus, Barron emphasized “[t]he
failures of existing media . . . to convey unorthodox, unpopular, and new
16 See Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1673 (stressing necessity of “adequate
opportunity for debate, for charge and countercharge”).
17 See id. at 1647 (criticizing romantic view of First Amendment for failing to recognize
“inequality in the power to communicate ideas”).
18 Id. at 1665.
19 Barron chose, in my view, an unhelpful illustration of judicial solicitude for media
power when he criticized New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as a judicial
license for powerful media to squelch debate by attacking reputations. See Barron, New
Right, supra note [x], at 1656-60; see also BARRON, supra note [x], at 7-12. Barron’s analysis of Sullivan paid insufficient attention to the Court’s careful assessment of the power
dynamics between public officials and their critics, see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-83, as well
as the particular power disparity between the Jim Crow-enforcing plaintiff and the civil
rights activists named as nonmedia defendants in the libel action. Given these factors,
Sullivan actually stands out as one of the Court’s most incisive defenses of public discourse
against private abridgement.
20 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 75-81 (criticizing Herbert Marcuse’s arguments for
“repressive tolerance”).
21 See id. at 85-89 (sympathetically considering Vice President Agnew’s charges that
liberal elitists were excluding conservative voices from the mass media).
22 See id. at 288-303.
23 See id. at 300.
24 Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1677.
25 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
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ideas [and] to afford full and effective hearing for all points of view.”26
Second, Barron tied the force of access claims to “the degree to which the
petitioner seeking access represents a significant sector of the community.”27 This principle would give members of socially and economically
marginalized groups opportunities to engage and influence public debate
without regard to social standing or economic means. By opening debate
to marginalized speakers, access rights would advance “the relationship
between a stable and vital political order and adequate access for protest
to the significant means of communication”28 and satisfy “the longing for
an information process which is truly participatory.”29
Central to Barron’s case for access rights was an attack on First
Amendment doctrine’s uncritical acceptance of a rigid public-private distinction. “Only the new media of communication can lay sentiments before the public,” he explained, “and it is they rather than government who
can most effectively abridge expression by nullifying the opportunity for
an idea to win acceptance.”30 The defining characteristic of the romantic
First Amendment doctrine he opposed was its “singular indifferen[ce] to
the reality and implications of nongovernmental obstructions to the
spread of political truth.”31 He cast powerful media institutions not as
legal persons with paramount expressive autonomy rights but as “nongoverning minorities”32 who abuse their control over important communicative infrastructure to stifle public debate. He charged any medium
that could support democratic discourse with the responsibility of doing
so.33 Accordingly, he contended that “[a]n access-oriented approach to
the first amendment implies affirmative obligation on government as well
as on the private sector and its concerns.”34 Even so, he opposed government surveillance of the press,35 and he conceived of the government’s
role in mandating access to privately owned media as strictly procedural,
disavowing any understanding of the First Amendment in which the gov26

Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1647.
Id. at 1677.
28 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 488; see also Barron, New Right, supra
note [x], at 1650. In this respect, Barron’s analysis ties First Amendment access rights to
the familiar “social safety valve” argument for expressive freedom. See Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884-86 (explaining
value of First Amendment for preserving balance between stability and change).
29 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 509.
30 Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1656; see also id. at 1669 (suggesting that
courts properly could treat newspapers, at least those with monopoly power, as having
“quasi-public status” for purposes of constitutional analysis).
31 Id. at 1643.
32 Id. at 1649.
33 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 494 (claiming that “any natural or
obvious forum in our society” bears “responsibilities for stimulating the communication of
ideas.”); see also Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1675 (contending that “the nature of
the communications process imposes quasi-public functions on these quasi-public instrumentalities”).
34 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 494.
35 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 54.
27
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ernment influenced the content of ideas.36 Access rights, in Barron’s conception, would “build counterbalances into each sector.”37
A final, crucial but little noted feature of Barron’s case for access
rights is his primary faith in courts, rather than legislators or bureaucrats,
to broaden access to the media. Barron contended that the First Amendment, given its instrumental purpose and egalitarian values, did not
merely permit but rather required broad access to the means of communication.38 He recognized that an access rights regime would present difficult legal questions, such as which points of view were absent from public discourse, where and how to require access for dissident speakers, and
how much media attention to public controversies would adequately feed
public debate.39 However, he anticipated and adroitly answered concerns
about judicial competence to resolve access claims: the necessary analysis, which would turn on “the public use and public need,” was “no more
complex a judicial task than is presently involved in analyzing the puzzles of apportionment, school desegregation and obscenity.”40 While
Barron endorsed legislative and regulatory reforms to expand access, particularly in the context of the electronic media,41 he believed “[i]t is by
the judicial process that we shall establish the contours for answers to
questions which a working right of access obviously presents.”42 Even in
areas of legislative action, such as right-of-reply statutes, Barron maintained that “[a] right of access law is far more likely to serve as an effective counterpoise to media power if administered in the courts.”43 Barron’s advocacy of a judicially enforced constitutional right of media access, while substantively radical, was also procedurally conservative.
Acutely aware of the ignoble history of press licensing, he posited that –
at least in cases of such traditionally nonregulated media as newspapers –
courts would more fairly strike the proper balance between publishers’

36

See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 507.
Id. at 509.
38 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 22-25 (advocating judicial creation of a right of access
to the press); see also Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1678 (positing that “it is open to
the courts to fashion a remedy for a right of access, at least in the most arbitrary cases,
independently of legislation”).
39 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 496 (summarizing legal questions
that access rights claims would present).
40 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 495; see also BARRON, supra note [x], at
65 (identifying judicial independence and experience in enforcing First Amendment guarantees as reasons to favor judicial administration of access rights).
41 See Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1674-76 (discussing sources of constitutional authority for access rights legislation); see also Barron, Emerging Right, supra note
[x], at 500 (“the existing structure of broadcast regulation permits an understanding of the
problem of access which can be inclusive enough to reach failure to recognize or seek out
dominant public issues”).
42 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 496. By the time of his 1973 book on
access rights, Barron realized that courts were refusing to implement access rights. See
BARRON, supra note [x], at 25.
43 BARRON, supra note [x], at 64.
37
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editorial interests and the public’s access interests.44
In the two decades following publication of Barron’s work on access rights, his arguments received forceful scholarly defense and elaboration, notably from Owen Fiss45 and Cass Sunstein.46 Like the Vietnam
era that fostered Barron’s ideas, and the McCarthy era during which
Meiklejohn developed his First Amendment theory, the present War on
Terrorism would appear to cast the importance of access rights into particularly sharp relief.47 Unfortunately, First Amendment doctrine and
more recent scholarly commentary have almost uniformly rejected Barron’s First Amendment vision.
B. Access Rights, First Amendment Doctrine, and the Fallacy of
Technological Optimism
The Supreme Court’s rejection of access rights is a familiar chapter in recent First Amendment history. Because I have told that story at
length elsewhere,48 I will not dwell on its details here. The Court in a
wide range of First Amendment disputes has foresworn any emphasis on
equalizing expressive access and enriching public debate, instead equating speech with property and thus insulating the economic market’s prepolitical distribution of expressive opportunities. Under present First
Amendment doctrine, mass media owners may refuse to sell advertising

44 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 495; see also Barron, New Right,
supra note [x], at 1667. Barron, perhaps mistakenly, valued the print media’s contributions
to public discourse above those of the electronic media. See Barron, Emerging Right, supra,
at 495. Even so, he avoided the trap of premising his case for access rights on technological
factors, emphasizing that economic consolidation in the print media posed as great an impediment to the diversity of public discourse as technological limitations of the electronic
media. Compare Barron, New Right, supra, at 1666 with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 387-89 (1969) (emphasizing broadcast spectrum scarcity in upholding FCC’s fairness doctrine). His argument for access rights turned not on scarcity but on the societal
benefits of informative, inclusive debate and the social reality of inequalities in the distribution of expressive opportunities. See Barron, New Right, supra, at 1645 (emphasizing need
to focus on content rather than technology).
45 See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES
OF STATE POWER (1996) (hereinafter FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY
OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J.
2087 (1991) (hereinafter Fiss, State Activism); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 781 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) (hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure).
46 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)
(hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
255 (1992).
47 See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional
Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254-57 (2005) (discussing parallels
between period that gave rise to Meiklejon’s First Amendment theory and post-2001 period)
(hereinafter Magarian, Substantive Due Process).
48 For a detailed account of the Court’s expressive access decisions, see Gregory P.
Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End
of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation Reinforcing Review, at ___-___ (forthcoming
2007) (hereinafter Magarian, Colliding Interests).
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space to political speakers;49 owners of shopping malls may ban speakers
who seek the access to public audiences that the public square once provided;50 wealthy concerns face few constraints in crowding more modestly funded voices out of electoral discourse;51 and copyright holders
face only minimal statutory constraints in barring incorporation of their
intellectual property into new creations.52 All of these rejections of access rights reflect the Court’s disregard for the interests of socially marginalized, disaggregated, and underfinanced would-be speakers – the
bearers of access rights claims – and solicitude for the interests of powerful institutional speakers – the targets of access rights claims.53 Those
priorities, in turn, reflect the Court’s rejection of a free speech theory
focused on advancing the public’s interest in informative, inclusive democratic discourse in favor of a theory focused on protecting empowered
speakers’ autonomy against government interference.54
The Court has employed two primary doctrinal strategies to dispense with access rights claims.55 In contexts such as the political advertising and shopping mall cases,56 which squarely present the question
whether the First Amendment guarantees some measure of access to
means of expression, the Justices deny the existence of access rights as
anathema to the First Amendment. In other cases, where advocates succeed in portraying access reforms as matters of legislative or regulatory
49 Compare CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (rejecting
political advertisers’ First Amendment claim of right to purchase advertising) with Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding statutorily authorized right of reply
requirement and emphasizing public’s interest in balanced information). For further discussion, see Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___.
50 Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting First Amendment right
of access to shopping center) with Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968) (announcing First Amendment right of access to shopping center). For
further discussion, see Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___.
51 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For further discussion, see
Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___.
52 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For further discussion, see Magarian,
Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___.
53 See Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2204-06 (2006). The Court still shows occasional
concern for the interests of marginalized and underfinanced speakers, although Justice
Stevens appears to stand alone in making that concern a priority. See id. at 2212-27.
54 See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First
Amendment, 44 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1939, 1951-52 (2003) (discussing Court’s shift toward autonomy-based First Amendment theory) (hereinafter Magarian, Political Parties).
55 In a broad sense, we might view free speech doctrine generally as a regime of access
rights, because the First Amendment requires people adversely affected by speech to bear
its costs. See generally Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1321 (1992). This redistributive element of free speech law appears most clearly in the
public forum doctrine, to the extent the Court requires the public to dedicate its property to
the expressive uses of people without access to private expressive property. Theorists on all
sides of the access rights debate, however, appear to agree that judicially mandated access
to privately held expressive property would entail a distinctive change in present First
Amendment doctrine.
56 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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discretion in areas of constitutional uncertainty, the Court submerges the
constitutional dimension of the problem and defers to the elected
branches.57 These twin strategies of denial and deference58 roughly correspond with, and reflect the influence of, the two principal theoretical
critiques of access rights – the libertarian critique, which objects to access
rights on constitutional principle, and the regulatory reform critique,
which embraces access reforms but opposes judicial recourse to the First
Amendment as a basis for expanding access. The bulk of this article will
address those two critiques.
One circumstance that might obviate the need for any theoretical
critique of access rights is the ongoing revolution in information technology. The explosion of online communication over the past fifteen years
has triggered a wave of technological optimism, which has led many
theorists to proclaim that cyberspace will ameliorate the communicative
inequalities that inspired Barron to advocate access rights.59 If the technological optimists are right, the open-ended character of online communication – the easy ability of anyone with a computer and an Internet
connection to join public debate – will by itself ensure the representation
in public debate of every variety of speaker and perspective present in the
body politic. Although the technological optimist argument does not indict Barron’s case for access rights as constitutionally out of bounds or
institutionally ill-advised,60 it does suggest a basis for shrugging off his
ideas as irrelevant. The Court occasionally has prefigured this argument
by invoking technological distinctions among media to reject access
claims.61
57 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding against
First Amendment challenge California constitutional provision for right of access to shopping centers); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding against First Amendment
challenge federal regulatory requirement that broadcasters sell advertising time to political
candidates).
58 See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___ (examining Court’s use of
denial and deference techniques in expressive access cases).
59 See, e.g., John P. Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace (1996),
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006);
Allen S. Hammond, Regulating Broadband Communication Networks, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
181, 190-92 (1992).
60 Various proponents of the libertarian and regulatory reform critiques of access
rights incorporate technological optimism into their arguments. See MARTIN H. REDISH,
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 190-92 (2001);
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech);
Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 225, 252 (1992); John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the
First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 100-31 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First
Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (hereinafter Sullivan, Intermediaries); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003) (hereinafter Yoo,
Rise and Demise).
61 Compare, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-89 (1969) (citing scarcity of broadcast spectrum as ground for upholding broadcast access regulation) with
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994) (rejecting Red Lion scarcity
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A thorough critique of the technological optimist position lies beyond the scope of this article. I simply offer a few observations about
why Barron’s case for access rights transcends recent and foreseeable
developments in information technology. Barron’s argument, as described above,62 implicates three distinct problems with the mass media:
that the cost of entry to media discourse excludes many speakers from
participating, and thus prevents many ideas from circulating; that, accordingly, private concentrations of wealth and power control media access to
a socially detrimental extent; and that the mass media generally fail to
contribute to public debate socially valuable discussions of important
issues from a wide range of perspectives. I will call these the cost, concentration, and contribution premises of the case for access rights. Even
in our age of burgeoning information technology, one or more of these
three premises will remain relevant for the foreseeable future, ensuring
the continued vitality of Barron’s case for access rights.
The media premise of the case for access rights that the Internet
most obviously undermines is cost. Anyone with access to a computer –
and fewer people every day fall outside that category63 – knows that the
Internet has created unprecedented, undeniable, and welcome opportunities for ordinary people of modest means to communicate with mass audiences. Even that cornerstone of technological optimists’ disregard for
access rights, however, has two plainly visible cracks. First, traditional
mass media, such as the major broadcast networks, commercial radio stations, and urban daily newspapers, still exert tremendous influence over
public debate.64 Continuing developments in online communication will,
albeit to an unpredictable extent, further marginalize the traditional media. Historical experience, however, suggests the new medium will never
completely eradicate the old ones. All of television’s technological innovation has never fully supplanted newspapers, magazines, and the radio.
That phenomenon probably owes something to the paradoxical advantages that limitations can confer. Faced with the opportunity to absorb
information passively from a screen, some people, some of the time, still
prefer active perusal of the printed page. In the same way, the Internet’s
customizable interactivity appears to make some people, some of the
time, appreciate television’s prepackaged mass appeal. Second, even the
Internet has already evolved to reward aspects of communication – such
as sophisticated graphics, highly interactive features, and the ability to
receive prime position from search engines – that require substantial re-

rationale as basis for justifying cable television access requirement).
62 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
63 See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the
First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 119, 140-42 (2001) (describing narrowing of the “digital divide”).
64 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 10 (noting that “traditional mass media . . . still play a crucial role in setting agendas because they still provide the lion’s share
of news and information to most people”).
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sources.65 This phenomenon reflects competition for scarce audience
attention in a world of virtually limitless information.66
The possibility that high costs of entry to significant public debates may persist even in cyberspace also implicates the second media
premise of the case for access rights – concentration. Although the Internet presents great possibilities for making communication more egalitarian, substantial structural inequalities persist in cyberspace. The complex
architecture of online communication is not some state of nature; rather,
it is a construct whose functions and attributes will always depend on the
regulatory constraints that both governments and nongovernmental authorities impose on it.67 The Internet, like traditional mass media, gives
powerful access providers both ample opportunities and strong incentives
to consolidate their power by creating communication bottlenecks.68 The
same economic factors that have produced concentration and undermined
diversity in the traditional mass media have carried over in substantial
measure to cyberspace.69 The Internet’s seemingly egalitarian diversity
of content actually facilitates consolidation, by generating a process of
preference-reinforcement that inclines audiences to focus on a relatively
small percentage of available content.70 Whether the future Internet will
look more concentrated or more disaggregated remains a very open question.
Finally, even in the technological optimists’ best of all possible
worlds – in which the Internet fully supplants traditional mass media and
everyone has an equal share in controlling it – the contribution premise
65

See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV.
839, 897-99 (2002) (discussing economic factors that could facilitate corporate dominance of
online media) (hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy
Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1453 (2004) (noting that “the benefits of scale and incumbency will continue to exist in the digital world”).
66 See Kreimer, supra note [x], at 142-43 (describing relationship between “digital
attention deficit” and increased expense of online communication).
67 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); see
also Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 896 (emphasizing that Internet merely
distributes content and carries no guarantee about diversity or nature of content it distributes); Eben Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1997) (criticizing Telecommunications Act of 1996 for favoring concentrated private interests rather than general
public in regulation of information technology); Margaret J. Radin, Property Evolving in
Cyberspace, 15 J. L. & COM. 509, 523-26 (1996) (describing Internet’s amenability to regulatory control and expressing doubt about unfettered market’s ability to produce an open,
competitive Internet).
68 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 295-96 (2002) (discussing
possibilities for online bottlenecks).
69 See id. at 285-307 (thoroughly analyzing economic features of online communication
and concluding that Internet has not ameliorated problems with market distributions of
media access); Goodman, supra note [x], at 1453-54 (noting traditional media powerhouses’
success in transferring their dominance to Internet).
70 See Clay Shirky, Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality (Feb. 8, 2003),
http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2006).
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for access rights arguably retains its salience. The contribution premise is
more obviously normative than the other two, because it values communication about particular subject matter – issues of substantial public concern – as well as diversity of perspectives and participants in debate. No
one can confidently predict whether even a highly disaggregated system
of online communication will exceed traditional mass media in fostering
discussion of public issues and bringing marginalized voices into public
discourse. The culprit, once again, is scarcity of audience attention. Although online content providers can produce endless quantities of information, audiences may expend their time available for Internet consumption before alighting on any matter of public concern.71 Those unmoved
by the normative priorities underlying the case for access rights tend to
brand any critique of audiences’ market choices paternalistic.72 However,
even assuming paternalism in this context is out of bounds,73 the online
audience’s apparent “choice” to disdain political debate might actually
result inexorably from content providers’ disincentive to produce information with broad, collective benefits rather than precision-guided appeal.
The Internet’s distinctive architecture makes implementation of
any online access rights regime a complicated proposition, requiring nuanced technological as well as legal insights.74 The Internet does not,
however, obviate the problems of cost, concentration, and contribution
that plague existing mass media and animate Barron’s case for access
71 For discussions of the relationship between attention scarcity and underproduction
of information about matters of public concern, see BAKER, supra note [x], at 289 (noting
that technology’s dispersion of audience attention complicates production of “many culturally or politically valuable media contents”); Goodman, supra note [x], at 1455-61 (identifying attention deficit and diminished quality of attention as factors of digital communication
technology that discourage production of information valuable for democratic deliberation);
Moglen, supra note [x], at 952-53 (indicting commodification of human attention as generating “media designed to force images and information at us, rather than to respond to our
requests”); Radin, supra note [x], at 517 (“In a world where attention is property, noncommodified political and social ideas and interactions may wither”).
72 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing libertarian view that
market distributions of expressive opportunities accurately reflect individual preferences).
For discussion of that argument’s empirical and normative failings, see infra notes ___-___,
___-___ and accompanying text.
73 Cass Sunstein contends that such “paternalistic” policy initiatives actually can
amount to “the people, acting in their capacity as citizens, . . . attempting to implement
aspirations that diverge from their consumption choices.” SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra
note [x], at 74.
74 Ellen Goodman offers a technologically and architecturally sophisticated proposal
focused on the value of targeted government subsidies in an environment of plentiful information and scarce audience attention. See Goodman, supra note [x], at 1461-67. For an
alternative proposal with more aggressive regulatory components, see CASS SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC.COM 167-90 (2001). Goodman’s proposal, in my view, makes a great deal of sense
on its own terms, although her analysis overstates the force of First Amendment impediments to more proactive regulation. See Goodman, supra, at 1462-64. Conversely, some of
Sunstein’s prescriptions, such as requiring any opinionated Web site to provide links to
opposing points of view, see SUNSTEIN, supra, at 186-87, overreach even a public rights
conception of the First Amendment while also taking insufficient account of technological
and architectural challenges.
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rights. Until and unless online communication eliminates all of those
problems, Barron’s arguments will continue to light a path toward the
goals of a better informed public and a more fully participatory democratic system. I now turn to the deeper questions that generate the two
principal critiques of access rights: whether a proper understanding of the
First Amendment precludes any government effort to broaden access to
the means of expression, and – if not – whether a proper understanding of
institutional arrangements within government marks the political
branches, and not the judiciary, as the proper source of those reforms.
II. THE LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF ACCESS RIGHTS
The decline of academic arguments for First Amendment access
rights roughly corresponds with the collapse of the Soviet empire. The
fall of the Berlin Wall has inspired a surge in free-market triumphalism,
unmatched since the Industrial Revolution, which infers from the collapse
of Soviet-style totalitarian bureaucratism a complete vindication of laissez-faire capitalism.75 This market triumphalism helps to contextualize,
and ultimately indict, the first of two principal intellectual critiques of
access rights:76 the libertarian critique. The first section of this part presents the conservative libertarian version of that critique, defined by an
autonomy-centered theory of the First Amendment, an unwavering faith
in economic market distributions of expressive opportunities, and a conviction that any deviation from a laissez-faire First Amendment amounts
to censorship bordering on tyranny. The second section discusses a
seemingly more moderate articulation of the libertarian critique, the progressive libertarian version. Although progressive libertarian theorists
express sympathy with the egalitarian and democratic concerns that animate calls for access rights and offer more nuanced analyses of free
speech issues, my discussion reveals that they echo all three of the conservative libertarians’ major chords. The final section contends that the
rigid constitutional commitment to markets that defines both versions of
the libertarian critique suffers from fatal empirical, theoretical, and normative problems.
A. The Conservative Libertarian Version
The libertarian critique emerges most predictably and straightforwardly from a group I will call conservative libertarians, which in75 See generally THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM,
MARKET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2001).
76 Not all of the critics discussed in this article respond directly to Barron’s case for
media access rights. Most of them criticize access rights alongside other regulatory proposals, including bans on hate speech and pornography, and some address ideas, such as campaign finance regulation, that fall within a broader conception of access rights. My discussion addresses arguments that either respond to access rights proposals or contribute to the
critic’s objections to access rights.
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cludes Charles Fried,77 Steven Gey,78 John McGinnis,79 and Christopher
Yoo.80 These theorists’ arguments against access rights, although varied
in approach and emphasis, make three common claims. First, they all
embrace an autonomy-focused theory of expressive freedom. The conservative libertarians proceed from a theoretical premise, axiomatic in
classical liberalism, that the First Amendment provides nothing more than
negative protection for speakers’ autonomy against government regulation.81 This autonomy-based approach to First Amendment theory serves
the normative political theory of interest group pluralism, which holds
that democratic societies properly distribute social goods through a process of conflict among groups of self-interested utility maximizers.82 Conservative libertarians seek First Amendment protection for speakers’
autonomy so that communication can facilitate those conflicts in the political sphere and, more importantly, market exchanges in the private
sphere.83 Fried exemplifies this approach when he describes communication as “a transaction between citizens” that free speech law protects from
collective interference.84
77 See Fried, supra note [x]. Fried attacks access rights alongside distinct proposals by
critical race and feminist theorists to alter First Amendment doctrine. My discussion is
limited to his arguments against access rights.
78 See Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PENN.
L. REV. 193 (1996). Gey as well attacks critical race and feminist proposals in addition to
access rights. My discussion addresses only his treatment of access rights, which primarily
targets Cass Sunstein. See SUNSTEIN DEMOCRACY, supra note [x].
79 See McGinnis, supra note [x].
80 See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
669 (2005) (hereinafter Yoo, Architectural Censorship); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note
[x].
81 See Fried, supra note [x], at 233 (“Freedom of expression is properly based on
autonomy . . . .”); Gey, supra note [x], at 232 (unfavorably comparing egalitarian free speech
regime to one that “attempts to allocate to nongovernmental actors the right to choose their
particular worldview and make their own basic decisions about social values”); McGinnis,
supra note [x], at 57 (positing expressive freedom as “rooted in the natural rights of the
individual”) (footnote omitted); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 316 (positing that
analysis of democracy-based approaches to free speech “turns largely on their ability to
come to grips with . . . autonomy-based visions of free speech”).
82 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1953 (describing correspondence
between autonomy-based First Amendment theories and interest group pluralism).
83 See Gey, supra note [x], at 262-64 n.212, 271 (arguing for superiority of interest
group pluralism over civic republican political theory); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 53-55
(asserting that proper understanding of expressive freedom turns on insights of public
choice theory and economic theories of communication); Yoo, Architectural Censorship,
supra note [x], at ___ (basing constitutional analysis of media policy on economic analysis of
media markets).
84 Fried, supra note [x], at 236.
McGinnis likewise seeks “to cleanse the First
Amendment of the obscuring varnish of social democracy and reveal its true origins as a
property right of the individual, thus providing a model for an emerging laissez-faire jurisprudence.” McGinnis, supra note [x], at 56. He derives this economically driven approach
to expressive freedom from a biological premise that “the human faculty of speech evolved
to improve economic well-being.” Id. at 55. He further asserts, based on the premise that
“civic understanding in a democracy is inevitably limited,” that democratic principles are
inappropriate not only in First Amendment adjudication but also “in other areas of social
life.” Id. at 126 n.320.
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Second, conservative libertarians oppose access rights because,
for them, the market’s allocation of expressive opportunities defines distributive justice, and thus any “information-producing property”85 is protected speech. McGinnis explicitly identifies speech as a property right.86
Fried celebrates private rights as “indifferent – blessedly – to the ideological uses to which their beneficiaries would put them,”87 and Gey similarly portrays the absence of government regulation as “neutrality –
which entails the protection of individual privacy and intellectual autonomy.”88 Yoo likewise dismisses concerns about distributive justice as
irrelevant to First Amendment analysis.89 These theorists presume
choices unconstrained by direct government regulation to be freely made
and thus immune to structural criticism.90 Thus, the existing market distribution of expressive opportunities, by definition, accurately reflects the
will of the people.91 Because conservative libertarians ascribe absolute
legitimacy to market distributions, the mere possibility that an access
rights regime might have disadvantages or might fail to achieve its aims
suffices to condemn it.92 Conversely, conservative libertarians dismiss
concerns about nongovernmental suppression of expression by invoking a
rigid public-private distinction, which denies corporations and other pri85

McGinnis, supra note [x], at 93.
See id. at 58-99 (arguing that Framers’ intent and economic theory require a property-based view of the First Amendment). On this basis, McGinnis finds a parallel between
the Court’s application of deferential First Amendment scrutiny to cable “must carry” requirements, see Turner Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), and the French
Revolution. See McGinnis, supra, at 117-18; see also Fried, supra note [x], at 230 (comparing access rights advocates to “Jacobins”).
87 Fried, supra note [x], at 235 n.47 (discussing “background systems” of tort, property,
and criminal law).
88 Gey, supra note [x], at 261.
89 See Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x], at 687 n.65; see also id. at 689-90,
715 n.209 (suggesting that regulatory attempts to ensure diverse viewpoints in public debate violate the First Amendment).
90 See Gey, supra note [x], at 212 (attacking idea that “individual preferences . . .
evolve as they adapt to new social conditions”); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 100 (characterizing Internet as “an example of spontaneous order” because it results from decisions “without the central direction of the state”); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 318-19 (proclaiming any questioning of process by which market influences preference formation “fundamentally inconsistent with most democratic forms of government”). Fried acknowledges
the existence of nongovernmental constraints on autonomy but presumes that “[o]ther legal
norms” outside the Constitution eliminate those constraints. Fried, supra note [x], at 23435.
91 See Fried, supra note [x], at 251-52 & n.205 (arguing that any underrepresentation
in public debate of “opinions on the left” must mean those ideas are “boring” and “unconvincing”); Gey, supra note [x], at 265 (claiming that access rights arguments merely reflect
the fact that “most of the public has used its existing freedom to reject or ignore . . . favored
programming in favor of other, less enlightening alternatives”); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x], at 675-713 (using economic analysis to deny existence of “market failures” in broadcasting).
92 See Gey, supra note [x], at 224 (arguing against access rights based on the possibility that they might “do more harm than good”); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 123 (discussing
practical advantages of market over “centralized authority”); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra
note [x], at 324-41 (discussing potential problems with implementing access rights).
86
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vate entities any legally cognizable capacity to undermine expressive
freedom.93 Any attempt to ameliorate privately driven constraints on expression runs aground on the twinned convictions that government can
only harm expressive freedom and that only government can harm expressive freedom.
Finally, conservative libertarians’ equation of the economic market with freedom leads them to equate any effort to create a more egalitarian distribution of expressive opportunities with tyrannical state interference in the proper working of the market. Gey and Yoo, beginning
with their article titles, repeatedly indict access rights as “censorship.”94
Gey situates access rights advocates among a class of “postmodern censors” who “would reinstitute a degree of government control over speech
and thought . . . so that the government could mold political reality to its
own liking.”95 Fried dredges up an especially pungent comparison, likening access rights advocates to “socialists”96 and “apologists for Marxism-Leninism.”97 Conservative libertarians dismiss as a fabrication the
portrayal of access rights as a substantively neutral effort to encourage
presentation of a wide range of viewpoints.98 Rather, they see access
rights as a means to force a specifically left-wing political agenda upon
an unsuspecting people.99 Fried, warming to his Cold War theme, por93

See Fried, supra note [x], at 234 (stating that “[p]rivate impositions and limitations
differ fundamentally from state impositions” because “they issue from the limiting person’s
own exercise of liberty”); Gey, supra note [x], at 242 (variously asserting that “the public/private distinction” and “some separation between the governors and the governed” is
necessary to democracy); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x], at 715 n.207 (dismissing concerns about private suppression of expression with conclusory statement that
“the state action doctrine . . . represents one of the central underpinnings of classic liberal
theory”).
94 See Gey, supra note [x]; Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x]. Indeed, Yoo’s
conception of “censorship” extends beyond access rights to any government action, such as
the choice to promote advertiser-supported broadcasting and restrictions on ownership of
media enterprises, that has the result of altering market distributions of expressive opportunities. See Yoo, supra, at 685 (discussing advertiser-supported broadcasting model), 701
(discussing horizontal ownership restrictions), 713 (discussing vertical ownership restrictions). McGinnis similarly sees any regulation specifically directed at informationproducing property as a presumptive First Amendment violation. See McGinnis, supra note
[x], at 116 & n.285 (criticizing media ownership restrictions).
95 Gey, supra note [x], at 198; see also id. at 260 (ascribing to access rights advocates
the “Orwellian” notion that “restriction equals freedom”); id. at 269 (“Speech regulations are
proposed as a means of permanently altering the thought patterns of the citizens living
under the control of the government”).
96 Fried, supra note [x], at 251.
97 Id. at 252.
98 See id. at 251 (claiming that access rights arguments based on “self-government and
support for the fullest measure of public controversy” are “not arguments we can take seriously”).
99 See Gey, supra note [x], at 231-32 (claiming that access rights would create an “elitist” regime); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 123 n.304 (asserting that “many academics on the
left favor regulation despite th[e] growth of information sources because of their growing
realization that most of the truths emerging from contemporary social inquiry are not hospitable to collectivist and egalitarian ideals”); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x],
at 674 n.13 (suggesting that structural media regulations mask intent to control media
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trays the case for access rights as “an argument for censorship . . . to
avoid the competition, in much the spirit that East European television
used to jam Western broadcasts of ‘Dallas.’”100
B. The Progressive Libertarian Version
More compelling, for anyone not normatively committed to unregulated market control of expression, is the critique offered by what I
will call progressive libertarian opponents of access rights, notably
Robert Post, Martin Redish, and Kathleen Sullivan. These theorists,
unlike the conservative libertarians, share the normative concerns of Barron and other access rights advocates about inequality in the distribution
of expressive opportunities and /or deficits in the quality of public debate.
Sullivan acknowledges the relevance of distributive concerns to First
Amendment doctrine.101 Post abhors “the inequalities that afflict our contemporary media [and] the many ways in which the quality of our public
discourse is undercut by the skew of market forces,”102 and he credits
access rights advocates with “a sincere and admirable effort to rejuvenate
democratic self-governance.”103 Redish, although generally suspicious of
redistributive impulses,104 seems to acknowledge the desirability of “enriching public debate by including the expression of those who normally
lack communicative access to the public at large.”105 All of these theorists care about the relationship between free speech and democracy.
Despite their normative sympathies, however, the progressive libertarians
reject as a constitutional matter any public initiative to broaden access to
the means of expression, viewing arguments for access rights as misguided egalitarian attacks on the laudable status quo that Sullivan calls
“progressive free speech libertarianism.”106
content).
100 Fried, supra note [x], at 252.
101 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution, and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 439, 450 (1995) (hereinafter Sullivan, Discrimination).
102 Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 1517, 1538 (1997) (reviewing FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note [x]) (hereinafter
Post, Equality and Autonomy).
103 Post, Mieklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1124.
104 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 153-61 (critiquing theoretical bases for redistribution).
105 Id. at 191.
106 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 203, 213 (1994) (hereinafter Sullivan, Free Speech Wars); see also REDISH, supra note [x], at 152 (praising traditional understanding of First Amendment); Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at
1539-40 (favorably contrasting “the free speech tradition” with arguments for access rights);
Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note [x], at 206-09 (favorably describing the “modern free
speech consensus”). Post has at times strongly criticized conventional First Amendment
doctrine, albeit in terms that do not undermine his libertarian perspective on access rights.
See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995);
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 678-79
(1990) (describing doctrinal failures related to concept of public discourse) (hereinafter Post,
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The progressive libertarians’ objections to access rights spring
from far more nuanced accounts of expressive freedom than the conservatives’ unvarnished market triumphalism. Sullivan argues that differences
between economic goods and speech justify perpetuating the constitutional asymmetry between the permissibility of economic regulations and
the impermissibility of speech regulations.107 Redish critiques access
rights within the broad framework of redistributive theory,108 and he
draws a damning comparison between access rights and impermissible
compulsion of expression.109 Post’s theory of expressive freedom rests
on an eloquent account of a functioning democratic society’s need for
open, robust communication.110 He indicts access rights as compromising
essential First Amendment protection for his conception of public discourse, in which “democracy attempts to reconcile individual autonomy
with collective self-determination by subordinating governmental decisionmaking to communicative processes sufficient to instill in citizens a
sense of participation, legitimacy, and identification.”111 All of these
conceptions of expressive freedom appeal to the same democratic values
that animate the case for access rights, and none openly venerates the
economic market’s distribution of expressive opportunities.
In addition to the nuanced rhetoric of their First Amendment theories, the progressive libertarians distance their attacks on access rights
from those of the conservative libertarians by emphasizing what they portray as an internal contradiction of the case for access rights. All of the
progressive libertarian theorists seek to drive a conceptual wedge between the two central goals of access rights: better public information and
broader democratic participation.112 Redish posits the asserted dichotomy
in the clearest terms, distinguishing “equality” of political participation
from “enrichment” of public debate as justifications for access rights.113
Post distinguishes between justifications for access rights that cast the
state as “parliamentarian” and “teacher.”114 Sullivan likewise distinOutrageous Opinion).
107 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
949, 959-65 (1995) (hereinafter Sullivan, Unfree Markets).
108 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 153-74.
109 See id. at 174-84.
110 For a useful introduction, see Post, Outrageous Opinion, supra note [x], at 626-46.
111 Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1115-16 (1993) (hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake). For further development of Post’s concept of public discourse, see Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, ANNALS OF AMER. ACAD. OF POL. SCI. (Jan. 2006) at 25-30; Post,
Outrageous Opinion, supra note [x], at 633-38.
112 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (deriving information and participation goals from Barron’s case for access rights).
113 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 161-68 (discussing equality and enrichment rationales).
114 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1528-34; see also Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 187-90 (1996) (recapitulating argument in
government subsidy context).
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guishes “allocative” from “distributive or paternalistic” justifications.115
This claimed discontinuity between improving informational quality and
broadening participation enables the progressive libertarians to argue that
access rights could improve public debate only if accompanied by unacceptably elitist substantive prescriptions.116 Attacking the internal dynamics of the case for access rights enables the progressive libertarians to
reject access rights without appearing to reject the normative priorities
that access rights seek to advance.
Behind their nuanced accounts of free speech and distinctive internal objections to access rights, however, the progressive libertarians
actually embrace – as a constitutional if not a normative matter – all of
the conservative libertarians’ central precepts. First, the progressive libertarians echo the conservative libertarian dogma that the First Amendment exists to protect personal autonomy against government interference. Without making autonomy quite the battle cry it is for the conservatives, the progressive libertarians still attack access rights in defense of
an individualist status quo. Redish has constructed an imposing structure
of First Amendment theory on the premise that constitutional speech protection exists solely to protect individual self-fulfillment.117 He especially recalls the conservative libertarians in focusing First Amendment
protection on property used for expression – in his phrase, “the associational enterprise that operates the expressive resource.”118 Sullivan
praises “[c]onventional First Amendment norms of individualism, relativism, and antipaternalism” and maintains that First Amendment principles
“preclude a norm of equality of influence.”119 Both Redish and Sullivan
join the conservative libertarians in painting a favorable picture of interest group pluralism as a democratic model.120 Post suggests a different
theoretical orientation by describing his First Amendment theory as
aimed at facilitating democratic self-determination,121 but he conceptualizes democratic process values in a way that subordinates them to individual autonomy values. “Individual citizens,” he explains, “can identify
115

Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note [x], at 956.
Jack Balkin posits a similar dichotomy, although without a libertarian agenda,
when he distinguishes populist and progressive tendencies in First Amendment thought.
See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J.
1935 (1995) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x]) (herinafter Balkin, Populism).
117 See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982).
118 REDISH, supra note [x], at 182 (footnote omitted). Redish argues that the First
Amendment should protect expressive property even when the owner has “no substantive
message to convey [but is] interested primarily or exclusively in maximizing profits.” Id. at
189.
119 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 663, 673 (1997) (hereinafter Sullivan, Political Money).
120 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 171-72; Sullivan, Political Money, supra note [x], at
680-82. For discussion of the conservative libertarian rejection of civic republican ideas in
favor of interest group pluralism, see supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
121 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1521.
116
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with the creation of a collective will only if they believe the collective
decisionmaking is in some way connected to their own individual selfdetermination.”122 Thus, he concludes, “[t]he enterprise of public discourse . . . rests on the value of autonomy.”123
Second, and centrally, the progressive libertarians echo, albeit in
subtler tones, the conservative libertarians’ belief in the market as the
only constitutionally legitimate arbiter of expressive opportunities. Post
strikingly rejects doubts about the underpinnings of market distribution –
the public-private distinction and the autonomous character of individual
choices – not because he can defend either premise on its own terms but
because he cannot conceptualize democratic self-determination without
fully crediting both of them. 124 “The ascription of autonomy,” he writes,
is “the transcendental precondition for the possibility of democratic selfdetermination.”125 Accordingly, he condemns as anathema to democracy
any regulatory effort to alter market distributions.126 Redish maintains
that the unregulated market gives all competing ideas a fair opportunity to
influence debate and insists that altering the market’s distribution of expressive opportunities in any way would contradict the terms of democracy by compromising self-determination.127 He also emphasizes a notion of “epistemological humility” that treats market distributions as inherently legitimate while discrediting any questioning of private power as
an impermissible appeal to “normative factors.”128 Sullivan endorses
market distributions of expressive opportunities by avidly embracing the
public-private distinction.129 Her avowed “differential distrust of gov122 Id. at 1524; see also Post, Democracy, supra note [x], at 26 (arguing that “the practice of self-government” turns not on “making particular decisions” but rather on “recognizing particular decisions as one’s own”) (herinafter Post, Democracy).
123 Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1118-19; see also Post, Equality and
Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1530 (emphasizing “the principle that the self-determining
agency of all persons should be regarded with equal respect” as basis for rejecting efforts to
equalize the distribution of expressive opportunities).
124 See Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1125-28 (discussing public-private
distinction); id. at 1128-33 (discussing autonomous character of individual choices). Post’s
assertion that our deepening social science knowledge about cultural influences on behavior
“is deeply incompatible with the very premise of democratic self-government,” id. at 1130,
resonates with McGinnis’ similar doubt about the sustainability of democratic values. See
supra note ___.
125 Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1131 (emphasis added).
126 See id. at 1121; see also Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1530-31
(characterizing access rights as impermissibly “repressing the speech of some in order to
augment the speech of others”); id. at 1537 (charging that, under an access rights regime,
“public discourse could no longer mediate between individual and collective selfdetermination”).
127 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 163-64. Redish defines “political equality” as requiring only “governmental neutrality in the restriction of private expression” and dismisses the
idea of substantive equality as unattainable. Id. at 163.
128 Id. at 170.
129 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 97982 (1995) (defending public-private distinction) (hereinafter Sullivan, Resurrecting); see also
Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note [x], at 207 (describing nongovernmental suppressions of speech as “exercises of editorial discretion, market judgment, social responsibility,
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ernment” reinforces the idea that the market distributes expressive opportunities neutrally130 and that egalitarian reforms would impermissibly
alter that neutral distribution.131 The progressive libertarians join their
conservative counterparts in presuming the market’s distribution of expressive opportunity to be an empirically reliable measure of people’s
preferences132 while treating any uncertainty about access rights’ efficacy
as reason enough to reject them.133
Finally, the progressive libertarians echo the conservative libertarian warning that any attempt to alter the market’s distribution of expressive opportunities amounts to statist tyranny. Too polite to parrot
Fried’s red-baiting,134 they nonetheless manage to make clear that access
rights advocates are enemies of freedom.
Post claims that “efforts to
equalize influence must involve both the equalization of ideas and the
control of intimate and independent processes by which individuals
evaluate ideas” and would therefore “verge on the tyrannical.”135 Sullivan characterizes access rights advocates as seeking authority for the
state to “reorder[] our ideological preferences.”136 Redish likewise concludes that an access rights regime would place the state “in a position to
manipulate the flow of private debate on the basis of predetermined substantive considerations.”137 The progressive libertarians join the conservatives in treating past governmental assaults on expressive freedom as
conclusive proof that government cannot enhance expressive freedom. 138
or just plain taste”).
130 See Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note [x], at 961-62.
131 See Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note [x], at 212-13 (critically describing egalitarian commitments of access rights advocates); see also Sullivan, Political Money, supra
note [x], at 675 (describing expressive freedom as “a realm of inevitable inequality”).
132 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1536 n.38 (arguing for presumption of market distributions because “we typically do not have access” to “a perspective
that is itself impervious to social circumstances”); Sullivan, Political Money, supra note [x],
at 677 (denying the possibility of any baseline from which to measure distortion of political
preferences); cf. supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing conservative libertarians’ belief that market distributions accurately reflect preferences).
133 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 165-66 (offering assertion that “[t]he impact of a right
of expressive access on the scope of public debate. . . is open to question” as a reason to
reject access rights); Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1529 (questioning
efficacy of regulatory efforts to improve public discourse); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against
Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 322 (arguing that campaign finance
reform’s ineffectuality as a redistributive device renders it impermissibly content-based);
Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note [x], at 986 (questioning capacity of government regulation to improve upon socially constructed preconditions for expression); cf. supra notes ______ and accompanying text (discussing conservative libertarians’ rejection of access rights
based on practical doubts).
134 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
135 Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1535; see also Post, Meiklejohn’s
Mistake, supra note [x], at 1120 (equating access rights with censorship).
136 Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note [x], at 987.
137 REDISH, supra note [x], at 150.
138 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 172-73 (recounting instances of governmental censorship); Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1136 (equating “[s]tate intervention”
with “[t]he nightmare vision of Michel Foucault”); Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note [x],
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Redish, amplifying the conservative libertarian charge that access rights
front for left-wing policy preferences,139 would reject access rights because they resemble proposals for economic redistribution.140 Post and
Sullivan sound a variation on this theme, claiming that the deliberative
idea of democracy that undergirds access rights proposals would entrench, in Sullivan’s words, “a partisan and controversial substantive conception of speech.”141
Both Sullivan and Post nominally hedge their bets by carving out
narrow spaces for permissible regulations related to speech.142 Sullivan
distinguishes between laws that regulate “the activity of speaking” and
those that regulate “the economic attributes of speaking, or in other words
the literal markets in which ideas are commodified,” proclaiming the latter sort of regulation unproblematic under the First Amendment.143 Accordingly, she endorses media cross-ownership restrictions144 and “must
carry” requirements imposed on cable systems.145 Post suggests that the
government “might perhaps” treat some broadcast media as quasi-state
actors146 and that campaign finance regulations might be tolerable “in the
most unusual and limited of circumstances.”147 Neither of their allowances, however, actually justifies any meaningful limits on market distribution. Sullivan’s constitutional suspicion of any effort to increase the
“diversity or competitiveness” of public debate148 and of regulations designed to serve the public interest149 effectively dooms cross-ownership
at 450 (“[T]here is good reason in our free speech history to suspect that discretion (both
legislative and judicial) will most frequently be exercised with a bias toward the governing
status quo.”).
139 See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
140 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 151; see also id. at 168-71 (attempting to discredit
access rights arguments as masking a substantive agenda of economic redistribution).
141 Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note [x], at 449; see also Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake,
supra note [x], at 1117 (claiming that a deliberative vision of expressive freedom is “ultimately grounded upon a distinctive and controversial version of collective identity”); Sullivan, Campaign Finance, supra note [x], at 323 (arguing that justifying campaign finance
reform on democratic process principles violates First Amendment).
142 Redish sticks to his hard line, considering but rejecting out of hand several narrower versions of access rights. See REDISH, supra note [x], at 184-90. His sole answer to
failings in the system of free expression is the promise of the Internet. See id. at 190-92.
143 Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note [x], at 964; see also Sullivan, Intermediaries,
supra note [x], at 1659 (explaining “Supreme Court’s deference to regulations that it can
characterize as market-structuring rather than ideological”); Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra
note [x], at 979-80.
144 See Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note [x], at 445 (distinguishing “markets in
ideas” from “markets in products that convey ideas” as basis for endorsing media crossownership restrictions).
145 See id. at 450-51 (characterizing “must carry” rules as promoting “diversity of competitors, not enforced diversity of substantive views”); see also Sullivan, Intermediaries,
supra note [x], at 1661-62.
146 Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1539.
147 Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1133.
148 Sullivan, Intermediaries, supra note [x], at 1661.
149 See id. at 1662.
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restrictions or “must carry” rules if the government intends them to affect
the quality or diversity of information available to the public – which is
exactly why the government imposes any regulation on an informational
market. Post’s theoretical allowance for regulation is simply too hesitant,
qualified, and grudging to have any discernible consequence. Paradoxically, he suggests justifying speech regulations by narrowing his category
of “public discourse,” which defines the very zone of democratic debate
in which access rights find their justification.150
C. The Failings of the Libertarian Critique
Once the progressive libertarians’ nuanced rhetoric and subtle arguments against access rights stand revealed as accessories to the familiar
conservative libertarian equation of expressive freedom with market distribution, a single set of objections can answer the libertarian critique.
The libertarians’ constitutional case for reserving distribution of economic opportunities to the economic marketplace, and thus rejecting access rights, fails on three levels: empirical, theoretical, and normative. I
will briefly set forth the principal objections that are most salient and
decisive in the context of Barron’s case for access rights.
On an empirical level, critical analysis forecloses the foundational
libertarian premise that any departure from market distributions of expressive opportunities contradicts authentic audience preferences. In
general, information is an extremely difficult good to commodify, because information by definition is unknown until it is acquired.151 If the
market excludes from the airwaves a speaker whose position the audience
has not heard, and whose existence may not even be known to the audience, then the market cannot be enforcing an audience preference to exclude her. In the particular context of the mass media, C. Edwin Baker
has built a watertight case against uncritical reliance on market principles,
even assuming those principles apply to other goods. Baker emphasizes
numerous ways in which special characteristics of media products – including substantial public good characteristics, significant positive and
negative externalities, and accountability to the dual demands of audi150 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1539 (stating that boundaries of
“public discourse” are “negotiable” and that “much regulation outside that arena is . . . constitutionally unproblematic”) (footnote omitted). This notion is especially curious given
Post’s concession that “[t]here is obviously no theoretically neutral way” to define the
boundaries of public discourse. Post, Outrageous Opinion, supra note [x], at 671.
151 This problem correlates with Arrow’s information paradox, which holds that sellers
of information, in order to persuade potential buyers of the information’s value, may have to
reveal the information and thus diminish or destroy its value. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962). Information in
this sense also constitutes a sort of “experience good,” because audiences have difficulty
assessing information’s value prior to receiving it. See Philip Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78(2) J. OF POL. ECONOMY 311 (1970) (explaining concept of experience
goods).
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ences and advertisers – can distort the market relationship between consumers’ preferences and media companies’ delivery of content.152 The
market’s commodification of information, and the background legal rules
against which the market necessarily operates, tend to influence the preferences people express.153 The market’s reliance on consumers’ ability
and willingness to pay necessarily overemphasizes the preferences of
wealthier consumers, an emphasis that requires normative justification.154
The market can measure only those preferences expressed through purchase decisions, a measurement that ignores people’s preferences for
other expressions of preference and that artificially favors preferences
that the market itself substantively influences.155 Baker’s analysis explodes the libertarian fiction that market distributions embody human
freedom and that any redistribution of expressive opportunities therefore
undermines liberty.156
On a theoretical level, the libertarian critics’ case for informational markets depends on a formalistic and underdeveloped distinction
between public and private authorities.157 Libertarian critics inevitably
invoke the sorry history of government censorship as if it inherently refuted the case for access rights,158 without considering the burdens that
concentrations of market power impose on people’s freedom to speak and
to receive information. Libertarians exacerbate their theoretical fallacy
by cloaking their defenses of powerful institutions’ expressive primacy in
the inapposite rhetoric of “individual” or “personal” autonomy,159 sub152

See BAKER, supra note [x], at 7-121.
See id. at 64-71.
154 See id. at 71-80.
155 See id. at 80-93.
156 The failure of the libertarian account of preferences discredits libertarians’ frequent
conflation of access rights advocates’ contention that collective processes necessarily influence individuals’ preferences with a paternalistic desire to impose particular preferences.
See Gey, supra note [x], at 212 (ascribing to access rights advocates the belief that “government should seek to cure the dissenters of their misguided attitudes”); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 323 (claiming that access rights advocates “regard[] the individual’s
personality as a social construct improvable by the state”). In fact, as Baker suggests, libertarians themselves engage in paternalism when they reduce people’s preferences to only
what the market can measure, see BAKER, supra note [x], at 83-84, and when they seek to
place the media beyond popular control. See id. at 121.
157 For a discussion of conceptual problems with the public-private distinction, see
Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 135-46
(2004) (hereinafter Magarian, Public-Private Distinction).
158 See Fried, supra note [x], at 226; Gey, supra note [x], at 278; Yoo, Rise and Demise,
supra note [x], at 338.
159 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note [x], at 182 (emphasizing democratic value of “personal
intellectual autonomy”); Fried, supra note [x], at 234 (“The paradigmatic free speech case is
one in which government prevents a person from speaking or punishes him for having spoken . . . .”); Gey, supra note [x], at 274-75 (asserting that “government regulation of speech
continues to deal with a highly individualistic phenomenon”); McGinnis, supra note [x], at
57 (claiming to advocate a theory “in which the First Amendment protects the individual’s
right to transmit his information”); Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1130-31
(focusing autonomy-based First Amendment theory on individual citizens); Yoo, Rise and
153
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merging the complex power relationships that enmesh flesh-and-blood
individuals, government institutions, and nongovernmental institutions. I
have contended that courts should understand the First Amendment, at
least in times of war and national emergency, as fully safeguarding the
expressive autonomy of natural persons, in order to preserve the essential
space within which we generate and evaluate ideas, but as shielding private institutions’ autonomy only to the extent it instrumentally serves the
paramount First Amendment value of collective self-determination.160
For libertarians, expressive freedom simply means a guarantee against
any alteration in the regulatory status quo that necessarily shapes market
relationships, regardless of where that status quo leaves the informational
quality and participatory character of public discourse. Their theory
promises meaningful freedom but delivers only a flimsy abstraction, unmoored to any principle save protecting the expressive entitlements of the
market’s winners.
Beyond these empirical and theoretical concerns, libertarians’ reliance on economic markets to distribute expressive opportunities presents massive normative problems. The libertarian analysis simply substitutes blind fealty to the market for any consideration of the value
judgments that necessarily underlie any policy choice, including laissezfaire distribution of expressive opportunities.161 The central normative
problem with the libertarian critique arises from the mass media’s unique
power to inform and influence democratic deliberation, providing opportunities for a wide range of people to participate in public debate and giving most members of the political community their most important source
of access to diverse perspectives and information on important controversies. If the media distributes access inequitably or presents only a limited
range of viewpoints on issues of public concern, then public discourse
suffers serious damage that may in turn undermine democratic selfgovernment.162 Constitutional speech protection serves, at least in subDemise, supra note [x], at 331 (describing state action doctrine in terms of “the relationship
between the individual and the state”). Redish defends the expressive rights of powerful
institutions based on the premise that institutions have feelings too. See REDISH, supra
note [x], at 180 (crediting “large media outlet(s)” with capacity for “cognitive dissonance,
public humiliation, and personal demoralization”).
160 See Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note [x], at 149-50.
161 Baker has captured the essence of the problem: “The most important and difficult
tasks for law and legal scholarship are to understand, interpret, and reason about values
and normative visions – and for this, economics is largely irrelevant.” C. Edwin Baker,
Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 747
(2005) (hereinafter Baker, Media Structure).
162 Post argues, to the contrary, that distributive justice concerns fundamentally contradict democratic values, because the substantive democratic commitment to selfgovernment necessarily transcends any baseline of distributive justice. See Post, Democracy, supra note [x], at 28-30. Democracy, on his account, requires not substantive equality
but rather “equality of agency” to participate in public discourse. Id. at 29. Expressive
freedom confers that equality of agency by “permit[ting] persons to speak in the ways, manner, and circumstances of their choosing.” Id. Thus, government regulations that impede
speakers’ choices violate democratic precepts. See id. at 29-30. Oddly, despite his acknowledgement that government sometimes must ameliorate material inequalities in order to
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stantial part, to ensure open and effective democratic debate. Libertarians’ insistence that courts should subordinate that constitutional value to
the vagaries of profit motives and demand curves – indeed, that courts
must do so – turns our democratic system on its head.
The progressive libertarian attack on the compatibility of access
rights’ two primary goals, broadening participation and improving debate,163 appears to furnish a logical riposte to access rights advocates’
normative complaint that market distributions disserve democracy. If we
have no good reason to believe that equalizing access to media would
improve public debate, the progressive libertarians ask, then how can we
justify departing from the market status quo? Like other libertarian arguments against access rights, however, this argument rests on nothing
more than a normative belief in the constitutional sanctity of market distributions. If the economic market produces the only distribution of expressive opportunities consistent with a proper understanding of the First
Amendment, then any absence of a speaker or idea from public debate
must amount to an efficient exclusion of irrelevant information, and altering the market’s distributive scheme could not possibly improve the quality of debate.164 The case for access rights, however, depends on a different normative account of the relationship between participation and information. Ingrained in the case for access rights is confidence in the
ability of an engaged polity to generate productive debate, with broader
participation producing a wider and more informative range of ideas for
the community to evaluate.165 That optimistic egalitarian premise, in my
view, resonates far more clearly than libertarians’ harsh social Darwinism
with our ideals and aspirations for participatory democracy.166
The danger of which libertarian critics most loudly warn is not
that access rights will fail to make democratic debate more informative
and inclusive but that any attempt to do so will censor speech and steer
debate toward favored substantive results.167 This authoritarian smear
makes for bombastic rhetorical theater, but it has nothing to do with Barsustain democratic legitimacy, see id. at 33, Post never explains how his formal vision of
expressive freedom can foster democratically legitimate discourse when some people can
indulge their choices to participate in materially expensive forms of persuasion while others
cannot.
163 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
164 Conservative libertarians, of course, openly condemn access rights advocates’ appeals to distributive justice concerns. See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. For
a thorough and eloquent defense of distributive justice in the context of media access, see
BAKER, supra note [x], at 71-80.
165 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Barron’s linkage between access rights’ informational benefits for the general public and participatory benefits
for marginalized speakers).
166 Indeed, the assumption that greater inclusiveness serves the instrumental ends of
democracy has become integral to our constitutional order. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change; Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107
HARV. L. REV. 30, 63-64 (1993) (discussing Warren Court’s reconciliation of protecting minority rights with advancing democratic values).
167 See supra notes ___, ___ and accompanying text.
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ron’s evenhanded, substantively neutral formulation of access rights.168
To some extent the discontinuity between Barron’s case for access rights
and libertarians’ attacks may result from the louder echo in libertarian
ears of Professors Fiss and Sunstein’s more recent appeals for access
rights. Writing during the relative political calm of the 1980s and early
1990s, Fiss and Sunstein displayed less concern than Barron about immediate threats to political dissent and arguably placed greater emphasis on
advancing their substantive social visions.169 Nonetheless, libertarian
critics’ blatant disregard of the procedural case for access rights reflects
both a methodologically careless inattention to Barron and a sad incapacity to imagine any constitutional world between the paradise of laissezfaire capitalism and the inferno of the absolutist state. To the extent libertarians bother to engage the procedural case for access rights, they insist that access rights, even if substantively neutral, would court tyranny
by requiring, in Fried’s phrase, “equality of results” among different
speakers who seek to influence public debate.170 That assertion, however, presumes an absolutist posture that no advocate of access rights has
ever taken. Any effort to make access to important social goods more
egalitarian requires ongoing assessment of what “equality” requires and
to what extent equalization should supersede competing social values.
The political theory behind the libertarian critique poses a final
normative problem. Libertarians treat interest group pluralism, and the
vision of autonomy it spawns, not merely as the best explanation of how
politics should work but rather as the only explanation consistent with a
meaningful account of expressive freedom.171 In contrast, arguments for
access rights usually, although not necessarily, resonate with civic repub-

168 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. Redish tacitly acknowledges Barron’s procedural approach, grudgingly conceding that “not all commentators who have
urged the creation of a right of access appear to advocate a seemingly process-based expressive redistribution as little more than a procedural means to achieve the substantive end of
economic justice.” REDISH, supra note [x], at 169. Astonishingly, that quotation comes from
a longer sentence. For a writer as articulate as Redish to torture the language so gruesomely betrays something – in this case, that he can raise no persuasive argument against
Barron’s forthrightly procedural theory of access rights.
169 See, e.g., Fiss, State Activism, supra note [x], at 2100 (advocating role for state as
“high-minded parliamentarian”); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x], at 17-23 (advancing Madisonian vision of democracy). If one reads Fiss and Sunstein fairly, however, their
commitments to substantive freedom of expression become obvious. See, e.g., Fiss, Social
Structure, supra note [x], at 1421 (advocating process norms for speech protection and disavowing direction of substantive outcomes); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra, at 35 (emphasizing dangers of speech regulation and stating that government should never regulate viewpoint or quality of conent).
170 Fried, supra note [x], at 230; see also Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x],
at 1534 (ascribing to access rights advocates the position “that the state be required affirmatively to ensure that all persons exercise equal influence on public discourse”); id. at
1537 (asserting that access rights proposals require “allotting speech in precisely equal
portions”).
171 See supra notes ___-___, ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing libertarian
critics’ commitment to interest group pluralism).
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lican principles.172 Access rights advocates posit a need for the political
community to debate openly and actively about the issues of public importance, including the proper policy balance between the values of
equality and autonomy. The idea of access rights makes no internal sense
if political values are not constantly subject to debate and the political
order open to revision. Thus, to the extent access rights rest on civic republican premises, those premises – and, indeed, all facets of access
rights – must remain constantly open to debate. Libertarians, on the other
hand, seek to entrench an uncontestable pluralist account of democracy
by reifying market distributions of expressive opportunities.173 From the
perspective of market triumphalism, the idea that democratic ideals might
cause us to favor redistribution of expressive opportunities is the only
political idea we may not consider.
III. THE REGULATORY REFORM CRITIQUE OF ACCESS
RIGHTS
The other critique of access rights, which I call the regulatory reform critique, embraces “access” but not “rights.” The first section of
this part describes the regulatory reform position. Like Barron and his
successors, regulatory reformers believe the market inequitably distributes important forms of expressive access, particularly access to the media. Also like the access rights advocates, regulatory reformers believe
government can and should work to solve the problem of inequitable distribution. The regulatory reformers, however, substantially accept as a
descriptive matter the libertarian premise that the First Amendment protects the autonomy of private actors, and they distrust courts as agents of
social reform. Accordingly, they would narrow the scope of the First
Amendment, in order to allow the elected branches of government to distribute expressive opportunities more equitably. The second section criticizes the regulatory reformers’ institutional prescription. The elected
branches, notwithstanding the regulatory reformers’ serene confidence in
their value for broadening media access, labor under a set of electoral
pathologies that generally fray elected officials’ accountability to the
people and particularly exclude the expressive interests of poor and socially marginalized speakers from elected officials’ political calculations.
In contrast, the First Amendment presents the most theoretically coherent
and normatively appealing basis for broadening expressive access, and
courts’ capacity to apply the First Amendment to access disputes makes
them the optimal arbiters of an access rights regime.
172 Compare Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1980-82 (discussing affinity
between republican political theory and First Amendment theory that accommodates access
rights) with Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J.
373, 382-88 (1993) (critiquing civic republican emphasis on consensus and making case for
access rights based on expansive conception of autonomy).
173 Ironically, libertarians repeatedly accuse access rights advocates of seeking to entrench a civic republican political theory. See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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A.

The Regulatory Reform Critique’s Theoretical Grounding
and Institutional Logic

C. Edwin Baker has articulated the most thorough regulatory reform approach to the media access problem. Baker’s core First Amendment theory resembles that of the libertarians, because he steadfastly asserts personal autonomy as the core value protected by the Free Speech
Clause.174 Baker, however, takes a distinctive and nuanced approach to
the autonomy theory, critically evaluating different entities’ autonomy
claims175 and subordinating autonomy to democratic values in the particular contexts of electoral speech176 and the media.177 He contends that the
instrumental interests of a healthy democracy, and not the autonomy interests of speakers, should dictate First Amendment protection in those
areas.178 Baker criticizes the mass media as “too timid in exposing corruption and abuse both of public and especially of private power, insufficiently diverse in its presentations, relatively unresponsive to significant
elements of society and more encouraging of political passivity than public involvement.”179 He strongly objects to First Amendment theories
that treat media institutions as primary subjects of rights or limit the
scope of democratic concern to efficient pricing of media products.180
However, he rejects the idea of constitutionally mandated media access
rights, because he believes courts lack both the authority to make normative judgments about what democratic values the press should serve at
any given time181 and the competence to make empirical judgments about

174

Baker articulates and defends his “liberty model” of expressive freedom in C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978)
(hereinafter Baker, Scope).
175 Baker has argued that commercial entities lack the autonomy interest necessary to
assert a First Amendment claim because the market, and not the commercial speaker’s
conscience, dictates the content of commercial expression. See generally C. Edwin Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976).
176 See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (1998) (hereinafter Baker, Campaign Expenditures).
177 Baker’s major recent statements on expressive freedom and the press include
BAKER, supra note [x]; Baker, Media Structure, supra note [x]; Baker, Media Concentration,
supra note [x].
178 See C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST.
COMM. 421, 436 (1993) (distinguishing relative importance of autonomy values and instrumental democratic considerations in speech and press contexts) (hereinafter Baker, Private
Power); Baker, Campaign Expenditures, supra note [x], at 28-29 (characterizing elections as
“institutionally bound” and measures that constrain electoral speech thus appropriate “to
assure the fairness and openness of elections”) (footnote omitted).
179 Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 426.
180 See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 854-60.
181 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 212-13 (advocating regime of constitutional space for
media regulation pursuant to Baker’s preferred democratic model of “complex democracy”);
Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 439 (questioning appropriateness of judicial determinations about how press should serve democratic values).
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the proper shape of access measures.182 Accordingly, he posits a First
Amendment “nonmandate”183 under which courts should uphold regulations that enhance media access, with particular solicitude for structural
regulations of media ownership.184 Baker’s conception of elections as
discursively limited constructs for converting public opinion into political
power similarly leads him to advocate constitutional allowance for regulations of electoral speech that would make electoral debate more participatory and informed.185
Jack Balkin has followed a circuitous intellectual path to arrive at
his regulatory reform orientation. In an early treatment of the access issue, in 1990, Balkin perhaps more closely tracked Barron’s case for access rights than any scholar before or since. He argued then that the idea
of democratic pluralism had come unmoored from its legal realist roots,
resulting in a First Amendment doctrine of formal equality that ignored
crucial inequalities in access to means of expression.186 As a remedy for
this ideological drift, he advocated a substantive understanding of the
First Amendment as requiring access rights, to be secured in the first instance by judicial enforcement.187 In a more recent commentary, however, Balkin argues that the growth of the Internet must alter our conception of expressive freedom in fundamental ways.188 While he disavows
the technological optimist credo that the Internet will solve all distributional problems,189 he nonetheless argues that the Internet’s democratizing effects on public discourse should shift our attention from equality to
autonomy and from problems of access to problems of censorship.190 He
also urges a shift in our institutional conception of expressive freedom,
182 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 199 (questioning judicial competence to make empirical determinations about effectuating access); Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 439
(same).
183 BAKER, supra note [x], at 199.
184 See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 905-06 (contending that healthy
democracy requires substantial dispersion of opportunities to influence public opinion).
185 See Baker, Campaign Expenditures, supra note [x], at 33-37.
186 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 387-94 (hereinafter Balkin, Realism) (explaining
development of libertarian aspects of First Amendment doctrine in terms of democratic
pluralism).
187 See id. at 412-13.
188 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x].
189 See id. at 31-32 (explaining why we should not expect Internet to solve problems of
media diversity); cf. supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (contesting technological
optimist arguments against access rights).
190 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 43-45 (arguing for renewed emphasis
on liberty in free speech theory). Balkin ascribes to technological developments perhaps a
larger portion of his theoretical evolution than they can plausibly explain. He does not
make clear, for example, why changes in communications technology should make popular
culture more important in First Amendment theory than it was before. See id. at 34-35
(advocating shift away from government and toward culture as object of free speech concern). Some of Balkin’s new ideas seem more plausibly rooted in his intellectual engagement with populism and critique of progressivism. See generally Balkin, Populism, supra
note [x].
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from a focus on judicial protection to a greater emphasis on the elected
branches of government and technological developments in the private
sector as guarantors of expressive freedom.191 Although Balkin does not
explicitly repudiate his earlier call for access rights, his new analysis emphasizes only the negative sense of the First Amendment and strongly
downplays the efficacy of judicially enforced expressive freedom.
Mark Tushnet does not address access rights proposals directly
but offers an alternative, contrary First Amendment vision responsive to
the same concerns that underlie Barron’s analysis. Tushnet sees in contemporary free speech doctrine a lamentable but intractable fixation on
protecting the rights of the powerful.192 Accordingly, in constitutional
law generally and the free speech context in particular, he holds out little
hope for judicially imposed progressive change. In his farthest reaching
argument about institutional approaches to constitutional law, Tushnet
advocates a regime in which robust notions of constitutional rights persist
but the people, acting through political processes, supplant judges as the
principal arbiters of constitutional values.193 In a milder variation on that
argument, he advocates a process of “weak form judicial review,” under
which constitutional doctrine would develop over time through judiciallegislative interaction on novel or unsettled constitutional issues.194 He
illustrates this process with what calls the “managerial model” of free
speech, under which courts defer to regulations that the legislature believes “increase the availability of expression – net, or on balance.”195
Without providing a full assessment of the managerial model, Tushnet
points out its manifestation in cases upholding cable “must carry” rules,
campaign finance regulations, and extensions of copyright protections.196
Tushnet acknowledges that the Court usually practices a stronger brand of
judicial review that constrains legislative initiatives to expand expressive
opportunities,197 but he suggests that weak form judicial review, as exemplified by the managerial model, would provide a normatively desirable
basis for regulatory efforts to enhance expressive freedom.
The regulatory reformers’ simultaneous support for egalitarian
government initiatives and skepticism about constitutionally driven
191 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 51-54 (arguing for shift in focus from
judicial protection of free speech rights to legislative, administrative, and technological
protection of free speech values).
192 See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314 (2005) (noting “[t]he emergence of conservative free speech absolutism on the Rehnquist Court”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 161 (1999) (criticizing free speech doctrine for underprotecting speech critical
of government while ignoring distributional inequalities) (hereinafter TUSHNET, AWAY
FROM THE COURTS).
193 See generally TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x].
194 See generally Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and “Core” Civil Liberties,
41 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. L. L. REV. 1 (2006) (hereinafter Tushnet, Weak-Form Review).
195 Id. at 12.
196 See id. at 13-16.
197 See id. at 3-4 (discussing Rehnquist Court’s defense of strong-form judicial review).
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change appears to reflect the complicated inspiration of the New Deal and
legal realism. The New Deal has strongly influenced those normative
premises of access rights that the regulatory reformers most obviously
embrace: the desire for more informative and fully participatory public
debate and the concern with achieving just distributions of expressive
opportunities.198 The regulatory reformers also echo access rights advocates’ quintessentially realist insight that the public-private distinction is
a normative construct rather than an inevitable and conceptually organic
precondition for freedom.199 On the other hand, the regulatory reform
position exemplifies the New Deal appetite for politically driven reform
and disdain for judicial interference with regulatory initiatives.200 The
regulatory reformers’ prescription for legislative and administrative action to expand access to the means of expression entails a high degree of
confidence in the elected branches, although regulatory reformers provide
few affirmative grounds for that confidence. Tushnet, the regulatory reformer who most thoroughly defends a greater role for elected officials in
constitutional interpretation, can only argue that judicial dominance of
constitutional law precludes any confident judgment that elected officials
cannot handle constitutional questions,201 while elected officials’ general
incentives would not necessarily stop them from protecting constitutional
rights.202 Conversely, regulatory reformers manifest severe doubts about
courts’ ability to achieve positive change by applying the First Amendment to inequalities of access. Those doubts, which define the regulatory
reform critique of access rights, have two distinct dimensions: one relating to the First Amendment’s substantive underpinnings, the other relating to courts’ institutional attributes.203
198 For evidence of the New Deal’s importance in shaping arguments for access rights,
see SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x], at 28-38 (advocating “a New Deal for Speech”);
Balkin, Realism, supra note [x], at 388-91 (tying instrumental, egalitarian theory of rights
to judicial revolution of 1937); Fiss, Why the State?, supra note [x], at 781 (invoking New
Deal in support of proposals for government regulation to improve public debate).
199 See Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 422 (“[T]he real question [about state
action] is always a matter of a substantive interpretation of constitutional norms.”); Balkin,
Realism, supra note [x], at 412 (advocating abandonment of rigid public-private distinction
in free speech context); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Its First Amendment Constituency, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 898 (1993) (critically analyzing role of public-private distinction in setting cognizable range of constitutional claims).
200 Tushnet expressly attributes his doubts about judicial protection of speech to the
New Deal paradigm. See Mark Tushnet, The Culture(s) of Free Expression, 76 Cornell L.
Rev. 1106, 1114 & n.27 (1991) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990)) (hereinafter Tushnet, Culture(s)).
Of course, as
Tushnet has acknowledged, the New Deal’s redistributive revolution also benefited from
judicial action, particularly of expressive opportunities. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN AND
MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 120
(1996) (discussing Supreme Court’s early public forum cases).
201 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 57-65 (discussing predictive problems caused by “judicial overhang’).
202 See id. at 65-70.
203 Those libertarian critics of access rights who address institutional considerations
dismiss the idea of judicial implementation with little or no analysis. See REDISH, supra
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The regulatory reformers’ objection to judicially mandated access
rights turns, first, on their First Amendment theory. Although regulatory
reformers largely share access rights proponents’ normative view that
redistribution of expressive opportunities would benefit society, they actually view the First Amendment in a manner consistent with the libertarians. As discussed above, access rights advocates construe the First
Amendment as an instrument for achieving effective debate; libertarians,
in contrast, object to access rights based on their belief that the First
Amendment simply prevents the government from compromising the expressive autonomy of people who possess the means to speak and be
heard. Regulatory reformers, although advocating access enhancements,
tend to agree with libertarians as a descriptive matter that the First
Amendment substantially serves to protect expressive autonomy. 204
Regulatory reformers’ disagreement with libertarians about the constitutionality of access-enhancing regulations boils down to a dispute about
how much territory the Amendment’s protective force should cover. Libertarians believe in a strong First Amendment; regulatory reformers believe in a weaker First Amendment that neither provides any guarantee of
access rights nor impedes the elected branches from redistributing access.
The second dimension of regulatory reformers’ skepticism about
courts’ role in broadening expressive access is institutional. Regulatory
reform arguments, reflecting widespread mistrust in the legal academy
about judges as agents of progressive social change,205 cast doubt on
courts’ ability to enhance marginalized speakers’ media access under the
First Amendment. The regulatory reformers emphasize courts’ persistent
failures to advance progressive free speech values, 206 but as Tushnet acknowledges, one branch’s shortcomings do not suffice to justify dislodging its authority.207 Just as the regulatory reformers offer few particular
reasons to favor the elected branches as vehicles for access reform, they
note [x], at 174 (dismissing judiciary’s capacity to administer access rights because of its
asserted failings in other First Amendment contexts); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 124-25
(asserting unnamed judicial “biases” and presuming inability of courts to assess access
claims under “neutral principles”); see also Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 325-26
(arguing that access rights proposals are unworkable).
204 See Balkin, Realism, supra note [x], at 385 (including autonomy among values
served by First Amendment); Tushnet, Culture(s), supra note [x], at 1107-10 (sympathetically analyzing eclectic theory of First Amendment that incorporates autonomy concerns).
Autonomy stands at the center of Baker’s normative free speech theory, although he puts
greater emphasis on democratic process values in the contexts of media and electoral regulations. See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
205 See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
206 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 129-33 (discussing conservative tilt of recent free speech decisions); Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at
848-55 (discussing conservative tilt in recent First Amendment decisions on media ownership); Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 19-21 (discussing present judicial equation
of speech with property in telecommunications policy disputes).
207 “The real question is whether in general legislatures or courts make more, and more
important, constitutional mistakes.” TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at
57.
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provide little to substantiate their low opinion of courts. Tushnet’s extensive critique of judicial review concludes that courts generally do no
more than reinforce the prevailing political order.208 Baker suggests,
without going into detail, that “[c]onstitutional adjudication is poorly
designed for crafting appropriate structural rules and media subsidies.”209
Balkin takes a similar view, with particular reference to the complexities
of advanced information technologies, in a similarly terse but sweeping
manner.210 The regulatory reformers’ objection to judicial review may
depend less on particular failings of courts than on the regulatory reformers’ normative visions of institutional design. Balkin’s and Tushnet’s
preference for a politically rather than judicially driven constitutional
order corresponds with their aspirations toward greater political populism.211 Baker expresses the same preference, albeit limited to the context of media regulation.212
B.

Courts, the Elected Branches, and Access Rights: The
Failings of the Regulatory Reform Critique

The regulatory reform critique depends on two complementary
premises, both of which I believe contain useful insights but ultimately
lead them to the wrong conclusion. First, regulatory reformers assert that
legislators and regulators have the capacity and will to implement access
reforms. That assertion ignores pathologies of our present electoral system that severely undermine the elected branches’ incentives to pursue
more informative and participatory public debate. Those pathologies take
on added importance because they embody exactly the sort of failures of
political debate that led Barron to advocate access rights. Second, regulatory reformers treat constitutional rights as a theoretical dead end, and
courts as an institutional albatross, in the quest for more egalitarian access to public debate. Those views underestimate both the First Amendment’s theoretical value for framing access interests and courts’ utility for
implementing a meaningful regime of access rights.

208 See id. at 152-53 (arguing that judicial deviations from prevailing political trends
amount to random alterations with minimal normative consequences in the aggregate).
209 BAKER, supra note [x], at 199.
210 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 53-54.
211 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 177-94 (defending theory
of “populist constitutional law”); Balkin, Populism, supra note [x], at 1985-90 (extolling
virtues of populist satisfaction with sporadic political engagement as opposed to “elitist”
preoccupation with ordinary politics).
212 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 213 (“[T]he Press Clause should be read to allow the
government to promote a press that, in its best judgment, democracy needs but that the
market fails to provide.”).
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1.

The Implications of Electoral Pathologies for
Legislative and Regulatory Access Reforms

Regulatory reformers, like access rights advocates, aspire to a
more egalitarian distribution of opportunities to participate, and a broader
range of ideas present, in public debate. Unlike access rights advocates,
however, regulatory reformers place their faith in elected officials213 to
accomplish that distribution. Unfortunately, several prominent features
of our electoral system discourage legislative and regulatory access initiatives. Some of those problems are permanent and inherent to the system
but not fatal to the access rights agenda. Others are distinctive to our
present political climate and, I believe, more toxic to hopes for legislative
and regulatory access reforms. First, several pivotal restrictions on electoral competition operate to make elected officials unaccountable to their
constituents. To the extent access reforms would serve a general interest
in broadening public debate, these pathologies of unaccountability remove elected officials’ incentives to advance that interest. Second, economically and socially marginalized members of the political community
continue to face several formidable barriers to electoral participation. To
the extent access reforms would serve to open opportunities for such people to participate in public debate, these pathologies of exclusion leave
elected officials especially unmotivated to advance that interest. Beyond
their destructive effects on elected officials’ motivation to implement
access reforms, all of these electoral pathologies underscore Barron’s
case for access rights in an even more direct way: each substantially diminishes the quality and openness of electoral debate.
a. Inherent Disincentives to Access Reforms
Public choice theory suggests one set of obstacles to legislative
and regulatory access reforms: Elected officials typically act to advance
their own self-interest, particularly the interest in holding on to power,214
and powerful and well-organized interest groups can capture them.215
These factors place two permanent, inherent obstacles in the path of access reforms. First, they create a strong disincentive for elected officials
to impose reforms that would alter the status quo by bringing new voices
and ideas into public debate. Second, and more ominous, they raise the
danger that elected officials, if granted the power to distribute expressive
opportunities, will abuse that power to advance their own interests or
213 This discussion uses the term “elected officials” as shorthand for the full range of
policymakers within the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.
Although state elected officials have some capacity to impose access reforms and face some
of the electoral pathologies I discuss in this section, I follow the regulatory reformers in
focusing my attention on the federal government’s appetite for access reforms.
214 See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
215 See, e.g., Peter Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1982).
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those of capturing interest groups.
These obstacles warrant some concern, but we should not overemphasize them. As to the disincentive concern, elected officials in the
past have implemented access reforms, including limits on political campaign contributions,216 mandates for access to private expressive property,217 and allocations of mass media space and time.218 Those reforms
indicate that ordinary political self-interest can correspond with egalitarian aspirations toward broadened expressive access. As to the abuse-ofpower concern, any suggestion that expressive distributions, including
market distributions, could ever avoid government influence contradicts
logic and history.219 Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld reforms of
all the types just noted, finding no dark pattern of censorship or manipulation. Tushnet, the regulatory reformer who focuses most intently on
institutional considerations, suggests that this compatibility of ordinary
politics with progressive constitutionalism provides a sufficient basis for
preferring elected officials to judges as guardians of constitutional
rights.220 The present political culture of the United States, however,
presents greater obstacles to access reform than just those inherent to
electoral politics. Our present electoral system suffers from an amalgam
of pathologies that dooms regulatory reformers’ vision of legislative and
regulatory access reforms.
b. Pathologies of Unaccountability
As discussed above, one benefit of a more egalitarian regime of
media access accrues to the public generally.221 More egalitarian access
to expressive opportunities means that the media offer the public a
broader range of ideas, which should in turn improve the quality of public
debate and the public’s level of confidence in the government decisions
that public debate informs. Enhancing public debate generally cuts
against elected officials’ self-interest by encouraging challenges to the
status quo. Thus, for elected officials to fulfill the role regulatory reformers assign them, they must have good reason to believe that betraying the public’s interest in enriching public debate will cost them more
than forestalling reform to preserve the status quo will gain them. They
must, in other words, be accountable to the electorate. Electoral account216 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding state contribution limits).
217 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding
property access requirement imposed by state consititution).
218 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding must-carry
rules for cable systems).
219 See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x], at 36-37 (explaining inevitable influence
of government regulatory structures on legal rights).
220 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 95-128 (positing that
important constitutional values are “incentive-compatible”).
221 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
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ability requires a meaningfully competitive electoral process in which
voters have realistic opportunities to unseat incumbent officials. Unfortunately, our electoral system in recent years has moved away from that
competitive ideal. Three especially pernicious and prominent failures of
electoral accountability that discourage media access reforms are partisan
gerrymandering of U.S. House districts, the calcification of the two-party
duopoly, and the dominance of political money.
In recent years, computer technology has transformed the power
to draw electoral districts from a blunt instrument into a surgical scalpel.
That transformation, in turn, has converted redistricting from a boost for
challengers into a shield for incumbents.222 The district-drawing process
has an especially significant effect on elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives.223 Consultants adept in the process can manipulate the
lines to exert decisive influence over apportionment of legislative power
between the two major parties.224 At times and in states where some
measure of partisan balance prevails, legislatures bargain over redistricting to build “safe” districts for incumbents of both parties. Where one
party dominates the state legislature, it often uses redistricting to disable
the other party’s incumbents and/or to build “safe” districts for its own.
Both of these “partisan gerrymandering” scenarios exploit the most predictable elements of the electorate to decrease the likelihood of electoral
competition.225 The Supreme Court on three occasions has considered
equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering, and three times it
has declined to address the problem, in what stands as one of the least
analytically satisfying lines of decisions in the Court’s recent history.226
Partisan gerrymanders undermine the cause of media access reform on
two levels. First, diminished competition means that elected representatives need not account to the electorate for their actions, because most
elections are decided long before the voters have their say. In the three
national elections between 2000 and 2004, 87% of incumbent Senators
and 97% of incumbent House members who sought reelection pre-

222 See Sam Hirsch, The United States of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 182 (2003).
223 For a thorough and incisive account of the effect redistricting had on U.S. House
races following the 2000 census, see id.
224 For a description of this process, see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY:
THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 17-27 (2006).
225 For a discussion of the threat that the systematic creation of safe electoral districts
poses to the health of our democratic system, see Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and
Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253 (2006).
226 See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607-12
(2006) (plurality opinion) (finding no legally impermissible use of political classifications in
off-year redistricting that increased Republican share of Texas’ 32-member House delegation from 15 to 21 seats despite small decrease in Republican vote percentage); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding no cause to grant relief for redistricting designed to increase Republican share of Pennsylvania’s House delegation from ten
of 21 seats to 13 of 19 seats); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(failing to settle on standard of review for partisan gerrymandering claims).
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vailed.227 In addition, partisan gerrymanders directly subvert public debate by manipulating the process to decrease the likelihood that electoral
debate can or will make a difference.228
Recent years have also witnessed a growing divergence of popular and elite sentiment about the two-party duopoly that dominates our
electoral politics. Voters increasingly claim weak political party loyalties
or identify as independent, rendering the parties more important as affinity groups within government than as engines for mobilizing public debate and participation in civic life.229 At the same time, the major parties
have fought fiercely and successfully to preserve the mechanisms by
which they control elections, resulting in an incongruous system in which
two massive political organizations that command diminishing voter allegiance nonetheless hold governmental authority in a virtual hammerlock.230 The Supreme Court has allowed the two major parties to control
primary elections as if they were private club meetings rather than forums
for public debate and decision,231 and it has let parties treat certain expenditures on behalf of their own nominees as “independent” under the
campaign finance laws.232 At the same time, the Court has taken great
pains to suppress the meek challenges our system permits to the two major parties’ dominance. The Justices have upheld state prohibitions on
fusion candidacies, which allow minor parties to increase their profiles by
co-nominating major-party candidates,233 and it has permitted televised
debate sponsors to enforce standardless exclusions of minor-party candi-

227

Center for Responsive Politics, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts ’06 Election
Cost
$2.6
Billion
(Oct.
25,
2006),
http://www.crp.org/pressreleases/2006/PreElection.10.25.asp (last visited Oct.
26, 2006).
228 In a broader view, the issue of partisan gerrymanders implicates the question
whether our longstanding system of single-member geographic districts filled by “winner
take all” plurality voting makes for an effectively representative House of Representatives.
See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
229 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans From Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 351-55.
230 For a discussion of the two-party duopoly and its theoretical underpinnings, see
Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1959-65.
231 See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (rejecting First Amendment challenge
to state’s semiclosed primary system, which barred registrants of one party from voting in
another party’s primary); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (sustaining First Amendment challenge to state’s blanket primary system, which allowed primary voter to select a candidate on any party line for each office). For further analysis of
Jones, see Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2011-23.
232 See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)
(striking down federal limits on expenditures parties make on behalf of candidates without
direct coordination between party and candidate). For further analysis, see Magarian,
Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2023-31.
233 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to state ban on fusion candidacies). For further analysis, see Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2031-37.
Will
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dates.234 Draconian ballot access laws in many jurisdictions continue to
make minor party challenges all but impossible.235 The two-party duopoly’s continued structural dominance of our electoral system, like the
manipulation of district lines, scuttles the hopes of regulatory reformers
both by diminishing electoral competition, thereby decreasing elected
officials’ accountability to voters, and by directly suppressing the multifaceted debate that an electoral system more open to dynamic competition
would foster.
Our present electoral system further erodes political accountability through the ever-increasing dominance of political money.236 No one
can mount a credible campaign for Congress without raising, or already
possessing, enormous funds. On the eve of the 2006 midterm elections,
the average House candidate had raised over three quarters of a million
dollars, while the average Senate candidate had raised almost $6 million.237 Incumbents could boast a nearly four-to-one fundraising advantage over challengers.238 Total expenditures for the midterms were on
pace to shatter the record-breaking midterm expenditures of 2002 by
eighteen percent.239 The Supreme Court has facilitated this state of affairs by holding campaign expenditure regulations categorically unconstitutional.240 My point here is not to revisit the question of campaign finance regulations’ constitutionality, although the First Amendment theory
that animates the case for access rights would permit significant limits.241
Whether or not unfettered campaign spending deserves constitutional
protection, it corrodes electoral accountability. Like district manipulation
and the two-party duopoly, political money does not serve but rather supplants electoral competition and public debate. The allegiance elected
234

See Arkasas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to public broadcaster’s standardless restriction of televised candidate
debates to major parties’ candidates). For further analysis, see Magarian, Political Parties,
supra note [x], at 2038-42.
235 See generally Richard Winger, More Choice Please! Why U.S. Ballot Access Laws Are
Discriminatory and How Independent Parties and Candidates Challenge Them., in RONALD
HAYDUK & KEVIN MATTSON EDS., DEMOCRACY’S MOMENT: REFORMING THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (2002).
236 This article cannot undertake a thorough examination of campaign finance as an
object of political and legal controversy. For an excellent introduction to the major issues,
see Burt Neuborne, One Dollar – One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1997). My position necessarily reflects normative and empirical
premises about the role of money in the political process. For a concise and lucid account of
a position based on very different premises, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
237 Center for Responsive Politics, supra note [x].
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam). The Court recently
reaffirmed its prohibition on expenditure regulations in Randall v. Sorrell, ___ U.S. ___, 126
S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (plurality opinion).
241 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2028-30 (discussing consequences
of a public rights First Amendment analysis for Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)).
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officials and political parties owe to the moneyed interests that finance
their victories crowds out their concern for ordinary voters and gives
them a huge incentive to protect the economic as well as political status
quo.242 Political money further decreases accountability by creating a
climate of alienation among people of modest means, discouraging them
from participating in the electoral process and thus from staking any
claim to their representatives’ attention.243 As for political discourse, our
system of minimal constraints on turning money into electoral speech acts
effectively as a debate tax, ensuring a high correlation between economic
power and expressive volume and thus drowning out less lavishly financed ideas.244 Advocates of unrestricted political money intone the
mantra that more money means more speech, conveniently ignoring the
corollary that greater expense means numbing repetition of the same narrow range of ideas.
c. Pathologies of Exclusion
The other primary benefit of a more egalitarian regime of media
access accrues to the particular people whose expressive opportunities
such a regime enhances. Those beneficiaries, through meaningful participation in public decisionmaking, can fulfill their rights of equal citizenship and claim a greater stake in public decisions.245 In order for
elected officials to care about that targeted benefit, however, they must
represent the members of those socially marginal groups. The failures of
general political accountability discussed above disproportionately affect
members of socially marginal groups: drawing of electoral districts continues to undermine the democratic aspirations of people of color;246 the
two “big tent” parties marginalize social and ideological outliers;247 and
political money necessarily diminishes poor people’s influence over elections. Even beyond those disproportionate failures of accountability, our
electoral system has found distinctive ways to diminish the ability of poor
and socially marginalized members of the political community to pursue
242 See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989) (examining influence of political money on
actions of elected officials).
243 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 638 (1982) (justifying campaign finance regulation as a means to ameliorate voter apathy that corrodes democracy).
244 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 111-16 (discussing “drowning out” effect of unregulated political money).
245 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
246 See generally GUINIER, supra note [x]. Once again, the Supreme Court in recent
years has exacerbated this problem by weakening the legal basis for racially remedial redistricting. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down redistricting plan
designed to remedy underrepresentation of black voters on ground that “bizarre” character
of districts under plan indicated racial motivation behind its design).
247 See generally Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1 (1998).
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greater political empowerment through media access reforms. Perhaps
our electoral system’s most appalling methods of discouraging elected
officials from enhancing poor and marginalized speakers’ expressive opportunities are outright intimidation and suppression of voters of color,
burdensome electoral procedures and “antifraud” initiatives designed to
disqualify poor and socially marginalized voters, and draconian felon
disenfranchisement laws that disproportionately impact the poor and voters of color.
Our electoral system continues to tolerate a shocking degree of
outright racial and ethnic discrimination. Voters of color frequently receive misinformation about times and requirements for voting.248 Mass
mailings or telephone calls on numerous occasions have either given false
advice or set voters up for special challenges and scrutiny at the polls.249
Some mailings have warned that undercover FBI agents or immigration
officials intended to patrol polling places to enforce criminal penalties for
voter fraud.250 At polling places, poll watchers have targeted AfricanAmerican and Latino voters, taking their photographs and asking for
identification, denying them assistance, and sometimes even openly intimidating them.251 Such tactics take root more easily because few people
of color work at polling places,252 and poll workers receive inadequate
training to assist non-English speaking voters.253 Laws in most states
prohibit voter interference and intimidation, but few provide specific
means of deterring or curbing these practices.254 Intimidation and thwarting of voters of color occurs even absent racist animus, because continued
racial polarization in voting often makes racial targeting strategically useful.255 Gulfs in wealth, education, and English proficiency between white
and nonwhite voters exacerbate the electoral system’s capacity to exclude
248 See People for the American Way Foundation and NAACP, The Long Shadow of Jim
Crow: Voter Intimidation and Suppression in America Today 7 (2004) (hereinafter Long
Shadow) (describing leaflet distributed in African-American communities in Louisiana in
2002 that encouraged voters to wait to vote until three days after election day); id. (describing notices posted in African-American precincts in Baltimore that listed the incorrect date
for election day and warned that any parking tickets or overdue rent must be paid prior to
voting)
249 See Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won’t Go
Away, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (2002) (describing 1986 Louisiana
mailing designed to challenge residency of African-American voters); id. at 362-63 (describing similar incident in North Carolina in 1990); id. at 365 (describing 1990 Texas mailing
that told voters of color to destroy absentee ballots they had requested, which would bar
them from voting under state law); id. at 365 (describing calls falsely attributed to NAACP
on eve of 2000 election that urged African Americans to vote for George W. Bush).
250 See Long Shadow, supra note [x], at 9-11; Swirsky, supra note [x], at 359.
251 See Laughlin McDonald, The New Poll Tax, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 30, 2002) at
___; see also Swirsky, supra note [x], at 363 (describing Republican “ballot security” program in California that hired uniformed security guards to patrol heavily Latino precincts).
252 See Barry H. Weinberg and Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places:
How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401, 420 (2002).
253 See id at 422.
254 See id. at 426.
255 For illustrations of this phenomenon, see OVERTON, supra note [x], at 72-79.
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voters of color.256 In addition, increasing attacks on provisions for bilingual ballots threaten further diminution of Latino and Asian-American
voters’ already low rates of electoral participation.257 All of these gambits make a mockery of any hope that elected officials will enact access
reforms to increase the ability of voters of color to influence public debate. Barring or discouraging people from voting also alienates them
from electoral and political debate, disproportionately skewing public
discourse away from their perspectives and concerns and thus exacerbating the conditions that make access rights imperative.
Beyond outright intimidation and interference, local control over
voting procedures creates endless opportunities for entrenched state and
local authorities to throw hurdles in the way of voters who might oppose
the status quo.258 The present trend toward more restrictive voting requirements represents a retrenchment after a period of greater inclusiveness beginning in the 1960s.259 An especially ominous addition to the
procedural gauntlet is the present campaign, engineered by conservative
groups, to impose state and local laws to require photo or other identification for voting. At least five states have added voter identification requirements since 2000, while political or judicial battles over identification laws continue in several others.260 Although advocates of identification requirements assert an intention to curb massive voting fraud, no
evidence points to any serious problem.261 Given U.S. citizens’ low rate
of voter participation, relative to earlier periods in our own history and to
voting rates in other advanced democracies, imposing burdensome and
unhelpful procedural constraints on voters seems perverse. The purpose
and effect of identification laws, however, is to discourage and inhibit
voters of color and the poor.262 The fact that some laws provide more
lenient standards for absentee votes, which carry stronger risks of fraud
but find disproportionate use among white voters, underscores the racial
strategy behind the antifraud smokescreen.263 The addition of identification requirements to our electoral system’s already formidable gauntlet of
voting requirements further frays the connection between elected officials
256

See id. at 82.
See id. at 131-47.
258 See id. at 45; Ronald Hayduk, The Weight of History: Election Reform During the
Progressive Era and Today, in HAYDUK & MATTSON, supra note [x], at 29, 40-42. Even a
seemingly basic component of our electoral process such as mandatory preregistration for
voting disproportionately deters the poor and people of color from the polls. See id. at 31
259 See J.M. Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in BERNARD
GROFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON EDS., CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 135-39 (1992)
(discussing historical trends in voting requirements).
260 See Peter Wallsten, Parties Battle Over New Voter ID Laws, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 12,
2006) at ___.
261 See OVERTON, supra note [x], at 161-63.
262 See id. at 153; Swirsky, supra note [x], at367-68.
263 See OVERTON, supra note [x], at 164 (describing Georgia identification law’s more
lenient standard for absentee ballots); Wallsten, supra note [x], at ___ (noting Arizona identification statute’s exception for absentee voting).
257
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and the speakers whose contributions to democratic discourse access reforms would enhance.
An additional strategy for purging the rolls of poor and minority
voters is legal disenfranchisement of convicted felons. Almost every
state denies the vote to people presently incarcerated on felony convictions.264 More controversially, three states permanently disenfranchise
ex-offenders,265 and nine others permanently disenfranchise certain categories of ex-offenders or impose waiting periods following the completion of an offender’s sentence before allowing application for restoration
of voting rights.266 Recent years have seen a modest trend toward loosening restrictions on felon voting,267 but several states have increased their
restrictions.268 An estimated 5.3 million Americans may not vote as a
result of felony convictions.269 More than two million of those ineligible
voters have completed their sentences.270 The racial impact of felon disenfranchisement laws is particularly egregious, with black men disenfranchised at a rate seven times the national average.271 Felon disenfranchisement laws deny the vote to thirteen percent of all black men – 1.4
million men who would otherwise be eligible to vote.272 Convicted felons, widely despised and shunned for reasons that give them important
and underpublicized perspectives on important public issues, epitomize
the potential benefits of access reforms. Felon disenfranchisement laws,
however, ensure that this is the last group of citizens to whom elected
officials will ever feel responsible and from whom the rest of us will ever
hear.
264 Laws in 48 states and the District of Columbia disenfranchise inmates incarcerated
for felonies. The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (hereinafter Sentencing Project, Laws). Thirty-six states disenfranchise felons on parole, and 31
of those states also disenfranchise felons on probation. Id. Maine and Vermont extend
voting rights to incarcerated felons. Id.
265 Id. Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia permanently disenfranchise any person with a
felony conviction. Id. Restoration of voting rights in Florida and Kentucky must be approved by the governor. Marc Mauer and Tushar Kansal, The Sentencing Project, Barred
for Life: Voting Rights Restoration in Permanent Disenfranchisement States (2005),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf (last visited July 29,
2006). Ex-offenders in Virginia may petition courts to regain the right to vote, but persons
convicted of violent offenses or of manufacturing or distributing drugs may not petition. Id.
266 Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note [x]
267 Of 13 states that have adopted changes to their felon disenfranchisement laws
within the past ten years, eight reduced restrictions. Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note
[x].
268 Massachusetts and Utah have recently disenfranchised incarcerated felons, and
Kansas expanded disenfranchisement laws to felons on probation. Steven Kalogeras, The
Sentencing Project, Legislative Changes on Felony Disenfranchisement 1996-2003 1 (2003),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/legchanges-report.pdf (last visited Oct.
26, 2006).
269 Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note [x].
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
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Our electoral system’s pathologies of unaccountability and exclusion make trusting elected officials to implement expressive access reforms an indefensible gamble. Accordingly, we should not be surprised
that federal media regulations in recent years have dramatically diminished competition and diversity while further consolidating the dominance of the largest media corporations.273 An unfortunate irony of the
regulatory reform critique is that our electoral system’s failure to engage
and represent the people, which regulatory reformers fail to address, ultimately reflects the same hegemony of economic power they attack so
eloquently. Regulatory reformers’ faith in the elected branches, like libertarians’ faith in the economic market, leads to a dead end in the quest
for more informative and participatory democratic debate. The two critiques’ failures point that quest back toward the First Amendment. Even
though the Supreme Court has exacerbated the electoral pathologies discussed in this section and built a discouraging record on media access
issues,274 constitutional law and judicial review continue to hold great
promise as engines of access reform.
2.

Putting the “Rights” Back in Access Rights

The regulatory reform critique objects to judicially enforced First
Amendment access rights on two distinct grounds: theoretical and institutional. On a theoretical level, regulatory reform critics reject the First
Amendment as a legal basis for expanding access to the means of expression.275 On an institutional level, they question judges’ capacity to develop doctrines of expanded access.276 Both of these objections rest on
legitimate and substantial concerns. Regulatory reformers’ discomfort
with constitutional rights as vessels for social change responds to progressives’ sometimes excessive reliance on litigation to implement policy
agendas in the wake of the Warren Court’s rights revolution and the subsequent conservative tilt in the country’s political mood.277 Their institutional doubt about courts’ capacity to effectuate social change responds to
courts’ failures to follow through on initially promising initiatives, such
as integration of public schools, and reflect the rhetorical difficulty of
defending judicially managed social reform.278 The regulatory reform
critique, however, substantially overstates both the theoretical disadvan273 See Goodman, supra note [x], at 1446-48 (identifying recent regulations’ contributions to increased media concentration); Moglen, supra note [x] (condemning corporatist
character of 1996 Telecommunications Act).
274 See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___ (discussing Court’s recent
failures to implement or approve many access reforms).
275 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
277 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 141-43 (criticizing liberals’ excessive resort to language of rights).
278 See id. at 177 (criticizing liberals’ fear of voting and overreliance on judicial review
to achieve social change).
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tages of constitutional rights and the institutional disadvantages of courts.
The regulatory reform critics oppose framing media access in
terms of constitutional rights because they mistrust both the general
rhetoric of rights and the particular conception of the First Amendment
that supports access rights. Both concerns implicate important normative
controversies that I have addressed elsewhere, and I reprise my views
only in summary fashion here. The regulatory reformers’ general concern
reflects a valuable insight that conceptions of “rights” necessarily depend
on normative priorities in designing legal structures.279 The language of
rights, however, remains crucial for arguments about expressive access as
long as we acknowledge the underlying conflicts of interests and values
those arguments necessarily embody. The First Amendment provides an
analytic channel for courts’ understandings of democratic values and the
people’s substantive ideals as well as a textual basis for judicial review
that the people and our elected representatives consider legitimate.280 It
also offers a unique source of rhetorical power for any argument about
how speech should function in society, including arguments for access
reforms.281 Regulatory reformers’ specific concern about the constitutional basis for access rights arises from the gulf between the autonomybased theory of the First Amendment they largely accept and the egalitarian, democracy-focused First Amendment theory Barron and other proponents of access rights advance. Barron’s sort of theory has the strong
normative advantages of deepening constitutional protection for especially valuable and vulnerable expression282 and providing a concrete,
functional rationale for protecting speech that resonates with both our
society’s deep commitment to participatory democracy and the central
purpose of the Constitution.283
Beyond their substantive concerns about the First Amendment as
a basis for equalizing expressive access, the regulatory reform critics dispute courts’ capacity to direct a regime of enhanced media access rights.
This institutional competence argument has undeniable force; no system
of constitutional adjudication could, or should, micromanage complex
279 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 193 (explaining that conceptions of rights vary with
underlying normative theories of democracy); TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra
note [x], at 13 (describing role of normative differences in opposing interpretations of constitutional rights); Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 25-28 (describing effect over time
of changes in prevailing normative values on changes in prevailing conceptions of constitutional rights).
280 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1990 (contending that language of
rights plays proper and useful role in disputes about political structures).
281 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1789-90 (2004) (discussing
the “magnetism” of the First Amendment).
282 See Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note [x], at 105-14 (describing utility of public rights theory of expressive freedom for effectively protecting wartime political
debate).
283 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1980-88 (describing key characteristics of public rights theory of expressive freedom).
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social controversies. But no access rights advocate has ever pretended
such micromanagement was necessary, let alone proper. Some access
controversies – for example, whether a media corporation may refuse to
sell advertising space to a political activist – lie fully within courts’ institutional capacities. In more complicated contexts, such as disputes about
concentration of media ownership, a court could articulate a general First
Amendment mandate aimed at enriching and diversifying debate, resolve
the immediate dispute pursuant to that mandate, and leave the elected
branches to enact and enforce regulatory structures that satisfy it. To the
extent the elected branches did succeed in implementing access reforms,
courts would play an essential role in articulating the First Amendment
values behind the reforms and ensuring that regulatory enforcement advanced those values.284 Elsewhere I have contended that courts can and
should apply to expressive access controversies a principle of “participation reinforcing review.”285 That extrapolation from the familiar idea of
representation reinforcement would lead courts, in First Amendment disputes that set access interests against autonomy interests, to make rulings
and develop legal standards that maximized opportunities for participation in public debate.
Even if we establish that courts can implement access reform under the First Amendment, the regulatory reform critique raises doubts
about whether courts will do so. The Supreme Court’s record on access
issues in both the electoral and media contexts appears to paint a gloomy
picture. Paradoxically, however, the Court’s recent conservative activism
illustrates the powerful effects that changes in prevailing legal theories
can have on the distribution of expressive opportunities. Hope for changing courts’ theoretical orientation, now or at any time, rests on the insight
that judges are less institutionally beholden than elected officials to entrenched interests. Perhaps, as regulatory reformers have argued, our
era’s judicial conservatism actually reflects a historical norm against progressive change, interrupted only briefly by the Warren Court, that no
appeal to reason can hope to dislodge.286 In my view, however, judicial
attitudes are too mutable, and the stakes of the access rights issue to high,
to give up the effort. I am not advancing the argument that “we have the
wrong judges,” whose futility Tushnet rightly derides.287 I simply note
that judges’ orientations do change, and have changed, through appeals
and processes that circumvent the formidable pathologies of our electoral
284 See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2008) (discussing importance of judicial review in
any renewal of the broadcast fairness doctrine).
285 See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___ (proposing and describing
participation reinforcing review of expressive access claims). The theory of representation
reinforcing review does not suffice to justify adjudication of access cases, because access
disputes generally present competing First Amendment interests. See id. at ___.
286 See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note [x], at 138 (suggesting that arguments for
positive First Amendment rights “run up against the entrenched conservative bias in constitutional law”).
287 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 155-63 (expressing doubts
about theoretical appeals to courts).
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system. For now, at least, theoretical arguments about the constitutional
wisdom of access rights may well face less resistance in the judicial
sphere than political activism for access reform faces in the legislative
and regulatory spheres.
Adroitly linking the conceptual limits of rights and the institutional limits of courts, Baker objects to access rights on the ground that
the theoretical underpinnings of democracy, and thus the optimal distribution of media access for facilitating democracy, are highly contestable.288
He supports his premise with an account of the differences among interest
group pluralism, civic republicanism, and a “best of both worlds” position
he labels “complex democracy.”289 Baker’s argument transcends the partisanship of libertarian objections to the republican underpinnings of access rights290 by maintaining that no theoretical perspective should
achieve hegemony through the force of constitutional law. No one could
dispute Baker’s premise that democratic theory is endlessly contestable,
but he fails to establish why courts cannot or should not join the contest.
One relatively narrow problem with Baker’s argument is that his rigid
distinction among democratic theories creates a distorted picture in which
hidebound commitments to utterly antithetical views of democracy drive
public debate – in which republicans, for example, care nothing for the
presence in public discourse of clashing points of view.291 Barron, in
contrast, conceived the constitutional dimension of access rights as serving both the participatory values Baker associates with pluralist democracy and the informational values he associates with republican democracy.292
A deeper problem with Baker’s analysis is that courts neither can
nor should resolve constitutional disputes without regard to democratic
theory. Baker attempts to constrain judicial review in First Amendment
cases by distinguishing “traditional censorship,” a matter about which he
claims all salient democratic theories agree, from the structural architecture of media, a matter he calls too contestable and contingent for constitutional adjudication.293 Baker’s categories, however, are themselves far
more contestable and contingent than he suggests. Is a purportedly neutral tax that disproportionately burdens particular publications censorious
or architectural?294 What about a requirement that broadcasters must sell
288 See Baker, Media Structure, supra note [x], at 760; cf. Schauer, Role of the People,
supra note [x], at 787 (criticizing efforts to distinguish democracy theoretically from majoritarianism).
289 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 125-213 (evaluating implications of different democratic theories for media policy).
290 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
291 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 148-49 (positing republican ideal of media that excludes “[s]egmented, partisan media”).
292 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing dual benefits of access
rights for general public and marginalized speakers).
293 See Baker, Media Structure, supra note [x], at 761.
294 See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking down
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advertising space at market rates to political candidates,295 or that cable
systems must devote part of their channel array to stations of the government’s choosing?296 The media challengers to all of those regulations
would (and did) complain of censorship, while the government would
(and did) characterize its intervention as architectural. Both characterizations have force, and neither can save a court seriously committed to enforcing the First Amendment from having to consider how our democratic
commitments require expressive freedom to work. In a broader sense,
our constitutional jurisprudence simply has never treated the theoretical
indeterminacy of a case as a basis for judicial abstention.297 If courts
could not decide cases with contestable theoretical underpinnings, then
they could not enforce constitutional rights at all.
Legal realism long ago established that courts operate within, not
apart from, democratic politics. The regulatory reformers follow the line
of judicial skeptics who consider courts’ inevitably political nature a reason to constrain their use of constitutional mandates. If courts openly
declared abstract democratic principles, and then forcefully invoked those
principles to strike down a wide range of government actions, the skeptics’ concern would carry great weight. Courts, however, do not operate
that way. Instead, they sublimate the abstract theoretical grounds for
their constitutional decisions, both because Article III limits their decisional ambit298 and because not even our system of strong judicial review
confers the institutional fortitude courts would need to make such sweeping pronouncements. Courts can, and must, base their constitutional decisions on underlying democratic precepts that the people will accept –
among which, I believe, is the principle that effective democracy requires
a broad distribution of opportunities to participate in public debate. Because background precepts are not holdings, courts can test and alter the
democratic underpinnings of their decisions through the dialogue in
which they necessarily engage with other political actors and the people.299 The judicial branch, in its own way, is as much a creature of our
sales tax on magazines that exempted religious, professional, trade and sports magazines);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)
(striking down use tax on paper and ink that affected only small number of newspapers);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down tax on advertisements
that applied only to high-circulation newspapers).
295 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding regulation prohibiting broadcasters from denying advertising time to candidates).
296 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II) (upholding federal requirement that cable systems must carry local broadcast affiliates); Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) (applying intermediate scrutiny review to must-carry rules).
297 Affirmative action cases, with their fundamental tension between formal and substantive theories of equality, present an obvious example. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action component of law school’s admissions
policy).
298 See U.S. CONST. ART. III (restricting federal courts to decisions of “Cases” and “Controversies”).
299 See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
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democratic system as Congress, and the judiciary’s peculiar set of democratic constraints protects it, and us, from unduly hidebound constitutional
decisions.
CONCLUSION
For at least fifteen years, judicial and scholarly attention to the
idea of First Amendment access rights has ranged from dismissive to hostile. Far too often the critics have gotten a free pass. Libertarians deride
access rights as an authoritarian plot against economic distributions of
expressive opportunities. Their market triumphalism, however, papers
over the severe doctrinal, theoretical, and above all normative failings of
a constitutional vision that substitutes economic power for robust public
debate. Regulatory reformers extol the possibilities of legislative and
regulatory access reform while dismissing the prospects of judicially enforced access rights. Their inattention to our electoral system’s pathologies of unaccountability and exclusion, however, fatally skews their institutional prescription. The time has come to reclaim and extend the trail
Jerome Barron blazed forty years ago. Deploying an egalitarian First
Amendment theory in pursuit of a democratic discourse that would better
inform the political community while giving greater voice to that community’s poor and marginalized members, Barron’s case for access rights
still offers a bold, optimistic blueprint for the expressive freedom a selfgoverning people needs and deserves.
Recent fashion’s regrettable disdain for access rights has diverted
attention from the pivotal questions of what forms access rights should
take and which institution(s) should determine those forms. Although
this article takes sharp issue with the regulatory reform critique of access
rights, the regulatory reformers deserve credit for asking important questions. As Barron’s own writings acknowledge, we cannot expect constitutional courts alone to transform the expressive landscape. Any effective broadening of expressive access will require the elected branches’
political authority and policymaking expertise. Accordingly, access
rights advocates might benefit in the near term from turning intellectual
energy toward securing judicial scrutiny of the electoral pathologies that
presently undermine aspirations toward legislative and regulatory access
reforms. Legal theorists usually address what I have called the electoral
pathologies of unaccountability and exclusion under equal protection
principles. Because those pathologies directly impede informative and
inclusive political debate, however, they also offend the same First
Amendment values at stake in media access controversies. Pursuing judicial scrutiny of electoral structures in order to enable access reforms
would acknowledge the elected branches’ essential role in expanding media access while reaffirming Barron’s wisdom in articulating a First
Amendment foundation for that expansion – a foundation of access rights.
(1993).

